Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

2009

Larry N. Long v. Ethics and Dicipline Committee of
the Utah Supreme Court : Brief of Appellee
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
VanCott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy; John A. Snow; Alex B. Leeman; Counsel for Appellant.
Office of Professional Conduct; Utah State Bar; Billy L. Walker; Adam C. Bevis; Counsel for
Appellee; Bruce Maak; Parr, Brown, Gee & Loveless; Chair, Ethics and Discipline Committee.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Long v. Ethics and Dicipline Committee of the Utah Supreme Court, No. 20091018.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2009).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/3002

This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

Adam C. Bevis, #9889
Assistant Counsel
Billy L. Walker, #3358
Senior Counsel
Office of Professional Conduct
Utah State Bar
645 South 200 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 801 531-9110

IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

LARRY N. LONG,
Petitioner/Appellant,

Appellate Case No. 20091018

ETHICS AND DISCIPLINE
COMMITTEE OF THE UTAH
SUPREME COURT,
Respondent/Appellee.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

VanCott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy
John A. Snow
Alex B. Leeman
36 South State Street, Suite 1900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1478
Counsel for Appellant

Office of Professional Conduct
Utah State Bar
Billy L. Walker
Adam C. Bevis
645 South 200 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Counsel for Appellee
Bruce Maak
Parr, Brown, Gee & Loveless
185 South State Street, Suite 800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Chair, Ethics and Discipline Committee

._
FILED
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS

Adam C. Bevis, #9889
Assistant Counsel
Billy L. Walker, #3358
Senior Counsel
Office of Professional Conduct
Utah State Bar
645 South 200 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 801 531-9110

IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

LARRY N. LONG,
Petitioner/Appellant,

Appellate Case No. 20091018

ETHICS AND DISCIPLINE
COMMITTEE OF THE UTAH
SUPREME COURT,
Respondent/Appellee.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

VanCott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy
John A. Snow
Alex B. Leeman
36 South State Street, Suite 1900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1478
Counsel for Appellant

Office of Professional Conduct
Utah State Bar
Billy L. Walker
Adam C. Bevis
645 South 200 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Counsel for Appellee
Bruce Maak
Parr, Brown, Gee & Loveless
185 South State Street, Suite 800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Chair, Ethics and Discipline Committee

TABLE OF CONTENTS

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

1

STATEMENT OF ISSUES

1

STANDARD OF REVIEW

2

DETERMINATIVE LAW

2

STATEMENT OF FACTS

2

A. Shepard Complaint: OPC File No. 07-0497

2

B. Nelson Complaint: OPC File No. 08-0049

5

C. Henriod Complaint: OPC File No. 08-0080

8

Vantreese
Hernandez
Firm Name & Letterhead
Screening Panel Determinations

8
9
10
10

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

11

ARGUMENT

12

I. Long Has Failed to Meet His Duty to Marshal the Evidence

12

II. The Findings of Fact Articulated by the Ethics and Discipline
Committee Were Sufficient to Justify Its Conclusions of Law

17

III. The Screening Panel's Recommendations Were Based Upon
Substantial Evidence in the Record

22

A. Shepard Complaint
B. Nelson Complaint
C. Henriod Complaint

22
24
24

IV. The Screening Panel Correctly Interpreted the Rules of
Professional Conduct When It Found Long Had Violated
Rules 1.5(a), 3.1, 5.3(a), 5.5(a) and 8.4(a)

i

26

A.
B.
C.
D.
E.

Rule 1.5(a)
Rule 3.1
Rule 5.3(a)
Rule 5.5(a)
Rule 8.4(a)

26
27
28
30
31

V. The Screening Panel's Disciplinary Recommendations for
Violations of Rules 7.1 and 7.5(d) Should Not Be Reduced

31

VI. The Screening Panel Recommendations Result From the Proper
Application of the Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability. Should
the Court Believe There Were Unintended Results, They Are
Properly Addressed Here, and not Through Additional
Proceedings Before the Committee or District Court
32
CONCLUSION

33

ADDENDUM
Petition to Amend the Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability, In re Utah
State Bar, Feb. 25, 2002

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES:
Attorney Grievance Comm'n ofMd. v. Monfried, 794 A.2d 92 (Md. 2002)
27
Chenv. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, 100 P.3d 1177 (Utah 2004)
12,13
Commercial Debenture Corporation v. Amenti, Inc., 2010 UT 10
12, 17
Harding v. Bell, 2000 UT 108, 57 P.3d 1093 (Utah 2000)
13
In re Babilis, 951 P.2d 207 (Utah 1997)
2, 18
See In re Edens, 544 S.E.2d 627 (S.C. 2001)
31
In re Farmer, 950 P.2d 713 (Kan. 1997)
29
In re Johnson, 48 P.3d 881 (Utah 2001)
19
Nemelka v. Ethics & Discipline Comm., 2009 UT 33,
210 P.3d 525 (Utah 2009)
2
State v. Clark, 2005 UT 75, 124 P.3d 235 (Utah 2005)
12
Travis L. Bowen v. Utah State Bar, 2008 UT 5, 177 P.3d 611 (Utah 2008)
1, 2
United Park City Mines Co. v. Stiching Mayflower Mountain Fonds,
2006 UT 35, 140 P.3d 1200 (Utah 2006)
12-13, 17
Utah Med. Prods, v. Searcy, 958 P.2d 228 (Utah 1998)
17
RULES:
Summary, Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability
Rule 14-510, Amendment Notes, Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability
Rule 14-510(b), Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability
Rule 14-510(b)(5)(E), Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability
Rule 14-510(c), Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability
Rule 14-510(f), Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability

18
19
1
19
19
1

Rule
Rule
Rule
Rule

26
27
28
30

15(a), Rules of Professional Conduct
3.1, Rules of Professional Conduct
5.3(a), Rules of Professional Conduct
5.5(a), Rules of Professional Conduct

Rules of Professional Practice 14-510(b)(5)(D), (E)
(amended to Rule 14-510(b)(7))

18

Rule 24(a)(9), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure

12

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS:
Utah Constitution article VII, § 4
OTHER AUTHORITIES:
Black's Law Dictionary 184 (Abridged 7th ed. 2000)
Petition to Amend the Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability,
In re Utah State Bar, Feb. 25, 2002

iii

1
26
19-20

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to the Utah
Constitution article VIII, section 4, which provides that "[t]he Supreme Court by rule shall
govern the practice of law, including admission to practice law and the conduct and
discipline of persons admitted to practice law." Effective November 1, 2009, the Rules
of Lawyer Discipline and Disability were amended to provide for the direct review of a
final determination of an admonition or public reprimand from the Ethics and Discipline
Committee. Rule 14-510(f), Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability. The underlying
proceedings before the Committee were conducted prior to November 1, 2009, and the
Office of Professional Conduct asserts that the amendment was not intended to have
retroactive effect. Therefore, this matter should come before the court as a Petition for
Extraordinary Relief under Rule 65B of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 19 of
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.1
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
I.

Whether the Findings of Fact articulated by the Ethics and Discipline

Committee were sufficient to justify its Conclusions of Law.
II.

Whether the Screening Panel's Recommendations were based upon

substantial evidence in the record.

1

As is noted in the Appellant's Brief, Long filed a Motion to clarify Procedure for Review
in light of the amendments to Rule 14-510. Appellant's Brief at 5. The OPC opposed
Long's attempt to seek review under the newly amended Rule 14-510(f) for the reasons
set out in its Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Clarify Procedure for Review,
essentially arguing that the amendments cannot be treated as having retroactive
application because they alter substantive rights. However, this Court made clear in
Travis L Bowen v. Utah State Bar, 2008 UT 5, 177 P.3d 611, that respondents could
seek review to this Court through Rule 65B, which the OPC believes is the proper
procedure in this instance.
1

III.

Whether the Screening Panel misinterpreted the Rules of Professional

Conduct when it found Long had violated Rules 1.5(a), 3.1, 5.3(a), 5.5(a) and 8.4(a).
IV.

Whether the Screening Panel's Disciplinary Recommendations, including

recommended discipline for violations of Rules 7.1 and 7.5(d), were improper or
inconsistent.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
For all the above issues, this is a case of first impression with respect to the
standard of review for attorney discipline sanctions of public reprimands (or
admonitions) imposed by the Utah Supreme Court's Ethics and Discipline Committee.2
Pursuant to the Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability, the standard of review for
sanctions imposed for professional misconduct in attorney discipline actions before the
state district courts is a correctness standard and the Utah Supreme Court may make
an independent judgment regarding the appropriate level of discipline if the evidence
warrants it. See In re Babitis, 951 P.2d 207 (Utah 1997).
DETERMINATIVE LAW
The relevant rules are set forth verbatim in the Appellant's Addendum.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A.

Shepard Complaint: OPC File No. 07-0497:

1.

On October 19, 2006, Steven Shepherd was charged in Third District

2

Other attorneys have sought review from this Court for discipline entered by the Ethics
and Discipline Committee. See Nemelka v. Ethics & Discipline Comm., 2009 UT 33, 210
P.3d 525, and Bowen, 2008 UT 5. In each case, the Court did not ultimately address the
issues presented here. In Bowen, the Court found that the respondent had waived his
claim for relief and denied his Petition. In Nemelka, the Court remanded the case for a
new Exceptions Hearing, without addressing whether the Committee had erred in
finding rule violations and recommending discipline.
2

Court with various crimes stemming from an arrest on October 14, 2006. (Shepard R.
00014.)
2.

After he was charged, Shepherd received correspondence from Long

dated October 16, 2006 offering a free consultation. (Shepard R. 000031-32.) He made
an appointment to meet with Long. (Shepard R. 000001.)
3.

Shepard met with Long on October 24, 2006, the day before Shepard was

scheduled for an initial court appearance. Long agreed to accompany Shepard to court
the next day for $100, which Shepard paid in cash. (Shepard R. 000194.)
4.

Shepard signed a Flat Fee Agreement for Legal Services. That flat fee

agreement provided for a fee of $6,600 for Long's representation of Shepard up to and
including the pretrial conference or preliminary hearing and subsequent sentencing
upon entry of a plea. (Shepard R. 000097-99.) Long also had Shepard sign a Flat Fee
Payment

Agreement

&

Promissory

Note,

(Shepard

R.

000103-04),

and

a

Representation Requirements document. (Shepard R. 000106-07.)
5.

Long attended Shepard's initial appearance with him, which, according to

Shepard's testimony, lasted approximately five minutes. After the appearance they
spoke outside the courthouse for approximately fifteen minutes. That was the last time
Shepard spoke directly to Long. (Shepard R. 000194-96.)
6.

Shepard testified that approximately two days after the first hearing he

contacted Long's office and informed them that he had decided to retain another
attorney. (Shepard R. 000198.) He further testified that he did not believe he had
retained Long to represent him in the DUI case. (Shepard R. 000198).

3

7.

Long testified that he spent no more than six hours working on Shepard's

case. (Shepard R. 000213.)
8.

On or about April 16, 2007 Express Recovery Services, Inc. (a collection

service) initiated an action against Shepard to recover the full amount of $6,600.00
under the flat fee agreement, plus interest and attorney's fees (a total of $7,775.34).
(Shepard R. 000037-38.) Long testified that his office must have provided the flat fee
agreement and promissory note to the collections service. (Shepard R. 000213.)
9.

Shepard discussed the collection action with an attorney, who then

contacted counsel for the collections service to negotiate a settlement. (Shepard R.
000199.) When the collection service's attorney contacted Long about the case, Long
initially informed him to negotiate for a $1,500 payment. (Shepard R. 000216.) After
Shepard complained to the Bar, and Long retained counsel, his counsel advised him to
cease the collection effort, which he did. (Shepard R. 000216-217.) Long testified to the
Screening Panel that the $6,600 fee he charged was "absolutely not" reasonable in light
of the work performed. (Shepard R. 000213.) Shepard ultimately did not pay Long any
fees beyond the $100 for the initial appearance. (Shepard R. 000200.)
10.

Long's correspondence to Shepard of October 16, 2006 uses the title "L.

Long Lawyers," as does the fee agreement paperwork. (Shepard R. 000031-32 &
000097-107.) Long conceded that "L. Long Lawyers" was a solo practice at the time the
letterhead was used. (See Long's 'Exceptions to Screening Panel's Findings of Fact,

4

Conclusions of Law, and Recommendation of Public Reprimand',3 Case No. 07-0497 at
13.)
11.

Shepard's complaint came for a hearing before Screening Panel C-2 on

February 19, 2009. The Screening Panel reviewed the file, and heard testimony from
both Long and Shepard. Following the hearing, the Screening Panel recommended that
Long be admonished for violation of Rules 1.5(a), 3.1, 7.1, 7.5(d) and 8.4(a). {See
Shepard Recommendation, p.1, Appellant's Addendum, Exhibit C.)
12.

Long filed an Exception to the Panel's recommendation, and that

Exception was heard by the Chair of the Ethics and Discipline Committee, Bruce Maak,
on October 28, 2009. (See Ruling on Exception, p. 1-2, Appellant's Addendum, Exhibit
D.)
13.

The Chair concluded that Long failed to carry his burden on Exception.

The Chair ruled Long failed to establish that the Screening Panel's recommendation
was unreasonable, unsupported by substantial evidence, arbitrary, capricious, or
otherwise clearly erroneous, and denied the Exception. {Id. p.7.)
B.

Nelson Complaint: OPC File No. 08-0049:

14.

On January 15, 2008 Gordon Nelson submitted information to the OPC

regarding his friend, David Merritt. Merritt was incarcerated, and asked Nelson to find
him a lawyer. (Nelson R. 000001.) Nelson contacted Long's office and talked to a nonlawyer employee named Joe Scheeler. (Nelson R. 000001.)

3

The actual recommendation was an admonition. For this citation, the OPC refers to
the title of the document in the record, which is dated October 22, 2009.
5

15.

Nelson stated that he talked to Scheeler, who negotiated the retainer

amount, and paid him $750 on or about April 18, 2007 (the receipt is dated April 18,
2007 but the check is dated April 28, 2007) (Nelson R. 000225.) Nelson stated that no
one appeared at a hearing for Merritt, so he called Long's office and again spoke to
Scheeler. Merritt had another hearing, and no one from Long's office appeared, so
Nelson again contacted Scheeler, and was told he needed to pay another $1,100, which
he did on April 20, 2007 (Nelson R. 000226.) Nelson stated that Scheeler informed him
that he could handle the matter himself, "as a mediator." (Nelson R. 000001-02.)
16.

On May 2, 2007 attorney Joseph Orifici wrote to Long, stating that he

represented Debbie Smith in matters relating to the protective order between her and
Merritt. (Nelson R. 000247.)
17.

Long's flat fee agreement with Merritt, for the defense of a violation of a

protective order, is dated May 23, 2007. (Nelson R. 000031-32.)
18.

On or about June 1, 2007 Scheeler conducted a "mediation" between

Merritt and Smith, and thereafter drafted a "Settlement Agreement." (Nelson R. 00002530.) The Settlement Agreement addressed the division of personal property, a
restraining order, counseling and other general provisions. (Id.) The Settlement
Agreement notes that Merritt was Long's client, and Smith was represented by Orifici.
(Id.) Long did not participate in the "mediation" or the drafting of the Settlement
Agreement. (Unofficial Transcript of Nelson Screening Panel Hearing, pp.5-6.)4

4

As is noted in the Appellant's Brief at p. 16, a transcript of the Nelson Screening Panel
Hearing could not be prepared by a transcription service due to the poor quality of the
audio recording. This citation is to an informal transcript Long prepared for the Nelson
Exception Hearing, and is found in the record.
6

19.

On June 11, 2007 Long wrote to Michael Nielsen, the prosecutor in

Merritt's protective order violation case, and informed him that Merritt and "the alleged
victim VOLUNTARILY COMPLETED a mediation with Joseph Scheeler and they are
currently working on a settlement and division of their property." (Nelson R. 000141.)
20.

According to Long, he employed Scheeler from February 3, 2007 to

November 2007, when Scheeler quit. (Nelson Transcript, p.2.)
21.

Long testified that he had an employment agreement with Scheeler which

informed Scheeler that he could not hold himself out as an attorney. (Id. at 4.)
22.

Nelson's complaint came for a hearing before Screening Panel C-2 on

February 19, 2009. The Screening Panel reviewed the file, and heard testimony from
Long. Following the hearing, the Screening Panel recommended that Long be publicly
reprimanded

for

violation

of

Rules

5.3(a),

5.5(a)

and

8.4(a).

(See

Nelson

Recommendation, p.1, Appellant's Addendum, Exhibit F.)
23.

Long filed an Exception to the Panel's recommendation, which was heard

by the Chair of the Ethics and Discipline Committee, Bruce Maak, on October 28, 2009.
(See Ruling on Exception, p. 1-2, Appellant's Addendum, Exhibit G.)
24.

The Chair concluded that Long failed to carry his burden on Exception.

The Chair ruled Long failed to establish that the Screening Panel's recommendation
was unreasonable, unsupported by substantial evidence, arbitrary, capricious, or
otherwise clearly erroneous, and denied the Exception. (Id, p.8.)

7

C.

Henriod Complaint: OPC File No. 08-0080:

25.

Judge Stephen Henriod wrote to the OPC on January 9, 2008 regarding

Long's representation of three defendants who had appeared before him: Annallicia
Vantreese, Jose Hernandez and Mark Kenney.5 Judge Henriod was prompted to write
to the OPC by what he believed were "egregious instances of overcharging." (Henriod
R. 00001.) Judge Henriod declined to notarize his complaint, and the OPC proceeded
with the investigation as the complainant. (Henriod R. 000038-42.)
Vantreese
26.

Vantreese was charged with possession with intent to distribute, a

second-degree felony. (Henriod R. 000020.) She retained Long to defend her and
signed a flat fee agreement for legal services on April 5, 2007 (Henriod R. 000488-90.)
The fee agreement provided for the payment of $8,000, which would cover
representation "up to and including pre-trial conference or Preliminary Hearing and
subsequent Sentencing upon entrance of a plea." (Id.) Long testified that he actually
received $8,900 from Vantreese. (Henriod R. 000344.)
27.

According to the docket, Long performed the following services: Appeared

for a pre-trial conference on December 4, 2006 and requested a continuance; appeared
for a pre-trial conference on January 22, 2007 and requested a continuance; Vantreese
was accepted into Drug Court on January 25, 2007; appeared at a pre-trial conference
on February 26, 2007 and requested a continuance; appeared for a pre-trial hearing on
April 20, 2007; appeared at a Drug Court hearing on May 3, 2007; and, appeared at a

5

The Screening Panel's Recommendation does not reference any findings regarding
Kenney, thus, that representation is not relevant to this review and is not discussed
further. (See Henriod Recommendation, p.2, Appellant's Addendum, Exhibit I.)
8

plea hearing on May 24, 2007 where Vantreese pleaded guilty. Long did not appear
with her at subsequent Drug Court hearings. (Henriod 000020-35.)
28.

Long testified that he performed work for Vantreese which is not reflected

in the docket. He told the Screening Panel he reviewed a tape of a preliminary hearing,
talked to his staff about the case, and negotiated with the prosecutor assigned to the
case. (Henriod R. 00634-36.)
29.

Long submitted an affidavit from attorney Gregory Skordas, stating,

essentially, that the rate Long charged was not unreasonable for the work performed.
(Henriod R. 000060.) Long also submitted to the Panel a lengthy "Accounting" of the
work he performed for Vantreese, which he constructed after the Informal Complaint
was initiated. (Henriod R. 00328-346.)
Hernandez
30.

Hernandez retained Long to defend him against two drug-related charges.

(Henriod R. 000008.) He signed a flat fee agreement for legal services on March 29,
2007 for the sum of $10,000. (Henriod R. 000085-87.) As in Vantreese, this agreement
provided for representation through the pre-trial conference or preliminary hearing and
subsequent sentencing upon entry of a plea. {Id.) Long collected $7,750 from
Hernandez. (Id. at 000653.)
31. According to the docket, Long performed the following services: On March
23, 2007 he made an initial appearance; on April 12, 2007 he appeared at a roll-call
which was continued; Long filed an appearance of counsel, a request for discovery, and
a motion to preserve evidence; on May 31, 2007 Long informed the Court that
Hernandez had been accepted into Drug Court; on June 28, 2007 Long appeared for a

9

change of plea hearing which was continued; and, on July 2, 2007 Long appeared for a
change of plea hearing. (Henriod R. 00008-18.) As with Vantreese, Hernandez then
proceeded through Drug Court without Long. (Id.)
32.

Long testified that he performed work for Hernandez which is not reflected

in the docket. He prepared a request for discovery and a motion to preserve evidence,
and he participated in a plea in abeyance when Hernandez was accepted into Drug
Court. (Henriod R. 000654.)
33. As in Vantreese, Long submitted an affidavit from Skordas stating that his fee
was not unreasonable. (Henriod R. 000060.) Long also submitted to the Panel an
"Accounting" of the work he performed for Hernandez, which was compiled after the
Informal Complaint was initiated. (Id. at 000063-78.)
Firm Name & Letterhead
34.

Long concedes that he presented himself to the public using the names

"L. Long Lawyers" and "Long & Associates" though he was often a solo practitioner
when those names were used. (Henriod R. 000608-10.)
Screening Panel Determinations
35.

The Henriod complaint came for a hearing before Screening Panel C-2 on

February 19, 2009. The Screening Panel reviewed the file, and heard testimony from
Long. Following the hearing, the Screening Panel recommended that Long be publicly
reprimanded

for

violation

of

Rules

1.5(a),

7.1

Recommendation, p.1, Appellant's Addendum, Exhibit I.)
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and

7.5(d).

(See

Henriod

36.

Long filed an Exception to the Panel's recommendation, which was heard

by the Chair of the Ethics and Discipline Committee, Bruce Maak, on October 28, 2009.
(See Ruling on Exception, p.1-2, Appellant's Addendum, Exhibit J.)
37.

The Chair concluded that Long failed to carry his burden on Exception.

The Chair ruled Long failed to establish that the Screening Panel's recommendation
was unreasonable, unsupported by substantial evidence, arbitrary, capricious, or
otherwise clearly erroneous, and denied the Exception, (/of, p.11.)
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The Ethics and Discipline Committee ordered disciple against Petitioner Long in
three underlying cases. Each matter was heard by a Screening Panel, which issued
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and a Recommendation of Discipline. Long filed
an Exception in each case, which were heard by the Committee Chair. The Chair
denied each Exception, and Long now seeks review by this Court.
As an initial matter, Long has failed to meet his obligation to marshal the record
evidence before this Court, and the Court should affirm the Committee's Orders of
Discipline. Regarding the merits of the arguments: the Screening Panel fulfilled its
obligation under the Rules of Professional Practice to state the basis upon which it
made its recommendations, based its recommendations upon substantial evidence,
correctly interpreted the Rules of Professional Conduct, and correctly applied the Rules
in each case.

11

ARGUMENT
I.

Long Has Failed to Meet His Duty to Marshal The Evidence.
Because Long is challenging the Screening Panel's Findings of Fact in each

case, the issues in this case present questions which are extremely fact-dependant.
Long is required to marshal all record evidence that supports the findings he challenges
on review. See Rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. "To pass this
threshold, parties protesting findings of fact must 'marshal all the evidence in support of
the findings and then demonstrate that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the
finding even when viewing it in a light most favorable to the court below.'" United Park
City Mines Co. v. Stiching Mayflower Mountain Fonds, 2006 UT 35, fl 24, 140 P.3d
1200 (quoting State v. Clark, 2005 UT 75, % 17, 124 P.3d 235). As this Court recently
held, "'[i]f the marshaling requirement is not met, we assume that the evidence supports
the trial court's findings and may affirm on that basis alone.'" Commercial Debenture
Corporation v. Amenti, Inc., 2010 UT 10 (internal omissions omitted) (quoting Chen v.
Stewart, 2004 UT 82, fi 76, 100 P.3d 1177).
Long notes in his Brief that he is aware of the appellant's obligation to marshal all
record evidence which supports the challenged finding. Long Br. at 29. He ostensibly
endeavored to do this in the Briefs "Statement of Facts" section. That section, however,
only contains certain facts which support the arguments he raised first on Exceptions,
and now to this Court for review. In United Park City Mines, this Court instructed:
'[P]arties are required to remove [their] own prejudices and fully embrace the
adversary's position'; [they] must play the 'devil's advocate.' In so doing,
appellants must present the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court
and not attempt to construe the evidence in a light most favorable to their case....
In sum, to properly marshal the evidence the challenging party must demonstrate

12

how the court found the facts from the evidence and then explain why those
findings contradict the clear weight of the evidence.
2006 UT 35 at If 26, citing Chen, 2004 UT at If 78 (quoting Harding v. Bell, 2000 UT
108, TJ19, 57 P.3d 1093). When a party fails to fulfill its marshaling obligation they will
face grim consequences, and the Court can rely on that failure to affirm the lower
court's findings of fact. United Park City Mines, 2006 UT 35 at fl 27.
The essence of Long's argument on review is that the Screening Panel failed to
articulate, sufficient Findings of Fact which would support its Conclusions of Law and
Recommendations of Discipline. It is not enough to state that the Findings, as written,
fail to sufTiciently enumerate every last detail of evidence upon which the Conclusions
are based. Rather, to marshal the evidence on review, Long must delve into the record
and demonstrate that there was not any evidence before the Panel which would have
allowed it to reach the Conclusions of Law in the underlying cases. Long has failed to
meet this burden in the "Statement of Facts" he presents, and this Court may properly
affirm the Committee's Orders.
The record of evidence which was before the Panels, and is now before this
Court, is voluminous. Despite Long's claim that "the record is devoid of facts which
would support many of the challenged findings" and that he "cannot marshal evidence
where no evidence exists," the record is replete with facts which support the Screening
Panel's Recommendations. Long Br. at 29, fn. 8. Without conducting an analysis of
each point in Long's "Statement of Facts", it should be sufficient to demonstrate by way
of example that Long has failed to marshal the evidence before this Court.
In the Nelson Complaint, the Screening Panel found that Long violated Rules
5.3(a), 5.5(a) and 8.4(a). See Nelson Recommendation, p.1, Appellant's Addendum,

13

Exhibit F. These violations were based upon work Long's non-lawyer employee,
Scheeler, conducted for Long's client, Merritt, and Long's contemporaneous knowledge
of that work. Long asserts that Scheeler conducted "an unauthorized mediation after
hours" and "allegedly conducted a mediation without Long's knowledge, and prepared a
document memorializing the parties' agreement." Long Br. at 17, point 21. This
understates the evidence in the record which establishes Long's knowledge of Sheeler's
actions.
The record establishes that Nelson (Merritt's friend, who sought representation
for Merritt) had his initial contacts with Scheeler in mid to late April, 2007. Nelson R.
000225. Scheeler prepared a Settlement Agreement which grew out of a mediation
which occurred on June 1, 2007. Nelson R. 000025-30. Long received a letter from
attorney Joseph Orifici dated May 2, 2007 which communicated that Orifici had been
retained to represent Smith concerning issues with Long's client, Merritt. Nelson R.
000247. Long's fee agreement with Merritt is dated May 23, 2007, weeks after Orifici's
letter and his receipt of Nelson's payments. Nelson R. 000031-32. After the mediation
Scheeler conducted, Long wrote a letter to Michael Nielsen, the prosecutor in Merritt's
protective order violation case, dated June 11, 2007. Nelson R. 000141. In that letter,
Long stated, "On June 1, 2007, David [Merritt] and the alleged victim VOLUNTARILY
COMPLETED a mediation with Joseph Scheeler and they are currently working on a
settlement and division of their property." Id.
This sequence of events demonstrates that Long knew that his office was in
some respect representing Merritt before his own fee agreement indicates the
representation began. Orifici's letter predates the fee agreement by 21 days. Further,
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and more significantly, Long's letter to Nielsen establishes that Long was aware of
Scheeler's "mediation" and efforts to agree on a settlement and division of property,
which was set forth in the Settlement Agreement Scheeler prepared. There is no
evidence in the record that Long, the only attorney in his office at the time, was assisting
Merritt in negotiations related to a settlement or property division, yet he informed the
prosecutor that the parties were doing just that. There is substantial evidence in the
record to demonstrate that Long knew Scheeler negotiated a property division and/or
prepared "the Settlement Agreement as of June 2007, but Scheeler remained employed
by Long until he quit in November 2007. The evidence in the record establishes that
Scheeler's conduct was improper, and that Long not only knew of such conduct, but
attempted to rely upon it for his client's benefit in the protective order violation
proceeding. Long's "Statement of Facts" fails to address this substantial evidence in the
record, yet these facts directly underpin the Rule violations the Screening Panel found
in the Nelson complaint.
Another example of Long's failure to marshal the evidence can be found in the
Shepard complaint. Shepard consulted with Long on October 24, 2006 and Long
appeared with him at a brief hearing the next morning. Shepard did initial and sign fee
agreement paperwork indicating a flat fee of $6,600, provided that Long represent him
through a pretrial conference or entry of a plea. Shepard R. 000097-99. Just two days
after meeting with Long, Shepard decided to retain another attorney and informed Long
that he was terminated. Shepard R. 000198. Long apparently failed to receive that
message, and appeared at Shepard's next hearing, where he learned that Shepard had
hired someone else. Shepard R. 000211. At that point, Shepard had paid Long $100,

15

and Long had appeared at a brief hearing, provided a free consultation, and mistakenly
appeared at a follow-up hearing.
According to Long's "Statement of Facts," "[IJater, Shepard received notice that
he was being sued by a collection agent for Long's fee." Long Br. at 13, point 4. Long
states that "[a]fter Shepard contacted Long's office and protested the lawsuit, Long
directed Express Recovery to cease their collection action." Id. at point 8. As in the
Nelson complaint, this factual presentation seriously understates the facts and evidence
in the record pertaining to Long's collection efforts.
Six

months

after

Shepard

informed

Long that

he

no

longer

needed

representation, Long caused a debt collection case to be filed against his former client
for the full amount of his flat fee agreement, plus costs and attorney's fees, for a total
attempted recovery of $7,775.34. Shepard R. 000037-38. By the terms of Long's own
flat fee agreement, he had not performed sufficient work to generate such a fee, as he
testified before the Screening Panel. Shepard R. 000213.
Long states that after "Shepard contacted [his] office and protested the lawsuit,
[he] directed Express Recovery to cease their collection action." Long Br. at 13, point 8.
That "fact" is not consistent with Long's testimony to the Screening Panel. When
Shepard learned that he was being sued for recovery of the flat fee, he contacted a
lawyer. That lawyer contacted Express Recovery to negotiate a settlement. According to
Long's testimony, he told Express Recovery how much time he had spent working on
the case, and Express Recovery told him they would negotiate for a $1,500 settlement,
instead of the full flat fee plus interest and costs. Shepard R. 000216. Around that same
time period, Shepard contacted the OPC about Long's actions, and Long retained
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attorney Charles Gruber to represent him for the Bar complaint. Upon Gruber's advice,
Long decided to cease the collections case to "buy peace with [the] man." Shepard R.
000216-217.
Again, Long understates the evidence and facts in the record which support the
Findings and Conclusions reached by the Screening Panel. In the Shepard case, the
Panel found that Long violated, among other Rules, Rules 1.5(a) (fees) and 3.1
(meritorious claims). The facts, as stated above, regarding Long's attempts to collect a
fee, which even he thought was unreasonable, by causing a meritless lawsuit to be filed
against his former client, are glossed over in Long's "Statement of Facts." These are the
very facts Long needs to marshal to fulfill his obligation under Rule 24(a)(9).
As the courts have done in United Park City Mines and Commercial Debenture
Corporation v. Amenti, Inc., supra, and as Utah courts have done in numerous other
cases, this Court should assume that ail the lower findings are supported by substantial
evidence in the record. See, e.g., Utah Med. Prods, v. Searcy, 958 P.2d 228, 233 (Utah
1998).
II.

The Findings of Fact Articulated by The Ethics and Discipline Committee
Were Sufficient to Justify Its Conclusions of Law.
When the Long Screening Panel hearings were held, Rule 14-510(b)(5) of the

Supreme Court Rules of Discipline and Disability controlled a Screening Panel's
recommendation of an admonition or public reprimand.6 The Rule states, in

6

When the November 1, 2009 amendments became effective Rules 14-510(b)(5)(D),
(E) were consolidated into one section, which is now Rule 14-510(b)(7). The relevant
language of the Rule is unchanged, and is set out verbatim in Appellant's Addendum.
As previously stated, the OPC believes the pre-amended Rules apply to this proceeding
and the citations in this section are to the Rules prior to the 2009 amendments.
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relevant part, that a "screening panel recommendation shall be in writing and shall state
the substance and nature of the informal complaint and defenses and the basis upon
which the screening panel has concluded, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the
respondent should" be admonished or publicly reprimanded. Rules of Professional
Practice 14-510(b)(5)(D), (E) (amended to Rule 14-510(b)(7)).
To support his argument that the Panel failed to sufficiently detail Findings of
Fact to support its disciplinary Recommendations, Long points to several civil and
criminal cases which consider the sufficiency of a district court's Findings of Fact. This
analysis misunderstands the attorney discipline system, and the very nature of the
disciplinary rules adopted by this Court. Essentially, Long attempts to place a false
burden upon the Screening Panels by comparing them to district courts. Some
background into the disciplinary rules is helpful in demonstrating why this is a mistake.
The Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability were adopted in 1993, significantly
changing the existing system of discipline to employ the district court as the fact finder
for formal complaints. See Summary, Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability. The
Advisory Committee on the Rules of Professional Conduct concluded that this model
was preferable "in terms of economy, efficiency, public access, fairness and familiarity.
Discipline ordered by a district court would be appealable to the Supreme Court without
prior review by the Bar Commission." See id.
The new rules maintained the use of the Ethics and Discipline Committee for
imposing private discipline, but provided for review of private discipline by the Chair of
the Ethics and Discipline Committee, rather than the Board of Bar Commissioners. See
id.] see also In re Babilis, 951 P.2d 207, 211 (Utah 1997).
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In 2003, the Court expanded the powers of the Ethics and Discipline Committee
to permit Screening Panels to recommend imposing public reprimands, which in turn
are entered by the Committee's Chair. See Rule 14-510(b)(5)(E), Rules of Lawyer
Discipline and Disability; see also Amendment Notes, Rule 14-510, id.
permitting

a

respondent

to

submit

an exception

to

the

Screening

The rule
Panel's

recommendation of private admonition, and to have a hearing if requested, was
amended to include public reprimands. See Rule 14-510(c), Rules of Lawyer Discipline
and Disability.
It should be noted that this Court seems to have the view that a closer level of
scrutiny by the Court is warranted in cases where an attorney's license might be subject
to restrictive discipline such as a suspension or disbarment. See In re Johnson, 48 P.3d
881, 886-887 (Utah 2001), where the Court states: "Because the private practice of law
cannot easily be stopped and started again, unless there is a substantial threat of
irreparable harm to the public, a disbarred lawyer should be entitled to a stay of
judgment pending appeal to this court where the final authority for discipline rests." The
OPC submits that because neither admonitions nor public reprimands restrict an
attorney's license to practice, the Court by its rule change acknowledged that the due
process provided by Rule 14-510 of the Rules was sufficient for the imposition of the
lesser non-restrictive sanctions.
Additionally, this expansion of the Screening Panel's authority acknowledged the
fact that "[u]nder the current sanctions standards the factual basis for a private
admonition and a public reprimand is essentially the same with the difference being the
level of harm to the client, the legal profession, or the administration of justice." Petition
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to Amend the Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability, In re Utah State Bar, Feb. 25,
2002, at 19, a copy of which is provided in the Addendum. As outlined further by that
Petition:
The change will allow the expedited resolution of similar cases because it
will eliminate the need to file formal complaints in the district court on
those cases that are only slightly above the standards for an admonition. .
. . As a practical matter, screening panels rarely, if at all, vote a matter
"formal" (i.e., find probable cause to send a case to the district court)
unless they believe the violation warrants suspension or disbarment. This
is because the time and expense required at the district court level is
considerable, and it is often difficult to justify the imposition of a "mere"
public reprimand.

The disciplinary system adopted by this Court recognizes that there is a
difference in the due process requirements for various levels of attorney discipline. More
serious discipline, which restricts the attorney's right to practice, is handled through one
of the district courts, which have enhanced responsibilities to enumerate more detailed
Findings of Fact. Had Long's case been a formal disciplinary action under Rule 14-511,
his arguments regarding the sufficiency of the Findings of Fact may have needed more
attention. That is, however, not the case before the Court.
Long suggests that the Screening Panel members should be held to the same
standards as a district court judge when he challenges the sufficiency of the Panel's
Findings of Fact This misstates the Panel's obligation. As stated by the Committee
Chair in the Henriod Ruling:
The Screening Panel procedure contemplated by the Rules of Lawyer
Discipline and Disability, while containing provisions assuring due process
and a reasonable record in the event of an Exception, do not envision the
level of detail and precision embraced with respect to civil and criminal
proceedings. Indeed, given the very nature of Screening Panel

20

proceedings and the volunteers who conduct them, such detail and
precision would not be practical or feasible.
Henriod Ruling, at 7, Appellant's Addendum, Exhibit J.
The Screening Panels are made up of volunteer attorneys and lay people. The
Rules provide that they can dismiss cases, issue letters of caution, dismiss cases upon
condition, refer cases to the Committee Chair for recommendations of low-level
discipline, or direct the OPC to file a formal case against the respondent for further
proceedings in district court. Rule 14-510(b), Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability.
The Screening Panels are not district courts, and their powers are relatively slight. They
suggest limited punishments which do not affect a respondent's ability to practice law,
they cannot compel respondents to settle financial disputes, and they certainly do not
contemplate any criminal sanctions. They have before them the investigative file
assembled by the OPC, and they solicit, during a scheduled one-hour hearing,
testimony from the respondent, complainant, and necessary witnesses, to fill in
information gaps which may exist in the file. They then deliberate about the evidence,
and, if they determine discipline is warranted, fill out a brief decision sheet addressing
their determination. The system is more informal than a district court, but it is so by
design, and helps to speed the efficiency of low-level attorney discipline cases. The due
process which is afforded to respondents is sufficient for the minimal discipline they face
from a Screening Panel. Long was afforded his necessary due process when the
recommendations were reviewed on Exception, and the Court should affirm the
Committee's disciplinary determinations.
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III.

The Screening Panel's Recommendations Were Based Upon Substantial
Evidence in the Record.
Long challenges here, as he did in the Exceptions, the sufficiency of the

evidence in the record which supports the Screening Panel's findings and conclusions.
This issue has already been covered in some detail when the OPC addressed Long's
failure to marshal the record evidence in Argument Section I, but the OPC will address
each matter individually.
A.

Shepard Complaint:

The Screening Panel found violations of the following Rules of Professional
conduct based upon the following general behaviors: 1) Rule 1.5(a) based upon making
an agreement for, charging, or collecting an unreasonable fee; 2) Rule 3.1 based upon
the bringing of a debt collection action for amounts in excess of those due for services
rendered; and, 3) Rules 7.1 and 7.5(d) for communicating, issuing a communication, or
using a firm name or letterhead implying Long's firm employed more than one attorney
when it did not. Shepard Ruling at 3, Appellant's Addendum, Exhibit D.
The record contains ample evidence regarding Long's excessive fee upon which
the Screening Panel based its Findings. The Panel heard from both Long and Shepard
about the representation Long did, in fact, provide. That was limited to a free
consultation, an appearance at a brief hearing, and some preparation for a subsequent
hearing (though, had Long communicated with his staff, he would have known that
Shepard terminated his services prior to the subsequent hearing). The Panel had the
signed agreement for a flat $6,600 fee for work up to and including a pretrial conference
or entry of plea. The record contains evidence that Shepard terminated Long well before
the case proceeded to that level. Long testified at the panel that a fee of $6,600 was
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excessive for the work he performed. The record contains evidence that Long caused a
collections action to be filed against Shepard for the full flat fee amount, plus interest
and costs, six months after Shepard terminated Long's representation. Long testified
that he was willing to negotiate that amount down to $1,500, and eventually dropped the
collections action after Shepard filed a Bar complaint and Long's counsel urged him to
cease the action.
The Panel entered Findings of Facts consistent with this evidence and concluded
that Long had "charged Shepard an unreasonable fee for services rendered," thereby
violating Rule 1.5(a). Shepard Recommendation at 3, Appellant's Addendum, Exhibit C.
Further, the Panel found that the evidence pertaining to Long's debt collection
established a violation of Rule 3.1. Id. at 4. Long argues that because he was the only
one who provided testimony regarding the reasonableness of the fee, the record lacks
evidence to suggest otherwise. Long Br. at 30. In actuality, Long testified to the Panel
that the fee was unreasonable, and then tried to blame his staff for sending the flat fee
agreement to the collections agency for action. Long, of course, cannot remove himself
from responsibility under the Rules of Professional Conduct by blaming his employees,
for it is he who is ultimately responsible for the conduct of his office. A review of the
record plainly establishes that the Panel had sufficient evidence to support their
Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendations of discipline for Rules 1.5(a) and 3.1.
Long doesn't dispute that the record supports the Rule 7.5(d) violation in the Shepard
Complaint. Accordingly, the Court should affirm the Committee's Order.
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B.

Nelson Complaint:

Long argues that the record lacks sufficient evidence to support "several of the
Screening Panel's findings and conclusions" in the Nelson Complaint. Long Br. at 31.
The Panel found violations of two substantive Rules in the Nelson Complaint: Rules
5.3(a) and 5.5(a).7 The Findings of Fact, and Conclusions of Law in the Nelson
Complaint clearly set forth the evidence upon which the Panel relied. Nelson
Recommendation, Appellant's Addendum, Exhibit F.
Rather than restate the record evidence which has already been presented, the
OPC will direct the Court's attention to this briefs Argument Section I, which specifically
lays out all the relevant evidence which directly supports the two substantive Rule
violations the Panel found in the Nelson Complaint. Accordingly, the Court should affirm
the Committee's Order.
C.

Henriod Complaint:

Long argues that the record lacks sufficient evidence to support several of the
Panel's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law regarding the fees he charged to
clients Vantreese and Hernandez. The Panel found that "Long charged excessive fees
for the work he completed in the Vantreese matter and the Perez Hernandez matter."
Henriod Recommendation, p.1, Appellant's Addendum, Exhibit I.

7

The Panel also found a violation of Rule 8.4(a). As the Court is likely aware, Rule
8.4(a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct states that it is professional misconduct to
violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct. This Rule ties the Rules
of Professional Conduct to the Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, and is found
in every instance where a respondent violates one of the substantive Rules of
Professional Conduct.
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The Panel had before it both Long's description of the services he performed and
the court docket's presentation of the court proceedings in which Mr. Long participated.
The Panel also had Long's "Accounting[s]" of the services he performed, which were
generated after the Informal Complaint was initiated by the OPC. Essentially, the
argument Long sets out in his Brief is that he testified that the fees he charged were
reasonable, and no one else appeared to counter that testimony, so the record lacks
evidence to establish that his fee was unreasonable.
It is not necessary for the complainant, or someone else, to appear before the
Panel and state that a fee is unreasonable when there is sufficient evidence presented
in the file, and at the hearing, for the Panel to make that determination. In this case, the
Panel had the court dockets, which reflected the few appearances Long made for each
client, the fee agreements, and Long's recounting of Ihe work he performed in each
case.8 The Panel also had the letter from Judge Henriod, who presided over the matters
and was familiar with the actual work Long performed.9
Based upon the weight of the evidence before it, the Panel concluded that there
was sufficient evidence to establish Long had, as a matter of fact, charged

It should be noted that much of the information Long provides in the "Accounting"
statements submitted in reply to the Informal Complaint are rambling narratives detailing
Long's thoughts regarding each matter. Long submitted little in the way of substantive
work product: such as pleadings filed with the court, letters to the prosecution, or other
credible evidence that he performed sufficient work to earn such large flat fees.
9
Long argues that Judge Henriod's letter isn't evidence because it wasn't verified. Long
Br. at 34. While it is true that an Informal Complaint needs to be notarized, and contain
a statement attesting to the accuracy of the information contained in the complaint
under Rule 14-510(a)(2), there is no requirement in the Rules which states the evidence
a Panel considers needs to meet such a requirement. The Screening Panels are free
weigh all the evidence which is before them to reach their conclusions. Much of that
evidence is generated during the OPC's investigation, which generally occurs after the
initiation of an Informal Complaint.
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unreasonable fees and, as a matter of law, violated Rule 1.5(a). Long does not
challenge the sufficiency of the evidence for the violation of Rule 7.5(d) Accordingly, the
Court should affirm the Panel's recommendation.
IV.

The Screening Panel Correctly Interpreted the Rules of Professional
Conduct When It Found Long Had Violated Rules 1.5(a), 3.1, 5.3(a), 5.5(a)
and 8.4(a).
A.

Rule 1.5(a)

Rule 1.5(a) states that a lawyer shall not "make an agreement for, charge or
collect and unreasonable fee or an unreasonable amount for expenses." Rule 1.5(a),
Rules of Professional Conduct. The Rule then lists several factors to be considered
when determining whether a fee is excessive.
Long argues that in the Shepard Complaint he did not violate this Rule because
he did not "make an agreement for, charge or collect an unreasonable fee." Again, the
record disputes that statement, and provides ample evidence to support the Rule
violation.
Long had a flat fee agreement with Shepard for $6,600 which contemplated
representation through a preliminary hearing or entry of a plea. Shepard fired Long two
days after that agreement was made. As stated in Utah Ethics Advisory Opinion No.
136 (1993), a flat fee agreement is not a per se violation of the ethics rules. The flat fee,
however, still needs to be earned under the factors listed in Rule 1.5(a). In this case,
Long's own testimony provides that he did not earn a fee of $6,600. Yet, he caused a
debt collection case to be filed against Shepard for that amount, plus interest and costs.
To "charge" is to demand payment; to bill.10 Long demanded payment, by way of a

Black's Law Dictionary 184 (Abridged 7th ed. 2000).
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frivolous debt collection lawsuit, for an unreasonable fee. When an attorney charges a
lot, for doing very little work, they violate Rule 1.5(a). See Attorney Grievance Comm'n
of Md. v. Monfried, 794 A.2d 92 (Md. 2002) (hearing judge's failure to find Rule 1.5
violation was clear error when lawyer received flat $1,000 fee to represent a client in
parole revocation, but did nothing beyond making a few phone calls to have the hearing
date scheduled). Thus, the Panel concluded that Long violated Rule 1.5(a). There was
no misinterpretation of this Rule in the Shepard Complaint.
In the Henriod matter, Long argues that the Panel's Finding that the fees were
"excessive" does not support its Conclusion that the fees were "unreasonable" under
Rule 1.5(a). This is terminological hair-splitting. The Panel found that the fees were
excessive based upon substantial evidence. They then concluded that excessive fees
are unreasonable under the factors of Rule 1.5(a). Again, there was no misinterpretation
of the Rule.
B.

Rule 3.1

Rule 3.1 states, in part, that a lawyer "shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or
assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing so
that is not frivolous." Rule 3.1, Rules of Professional Conduct. Long caused a debt
collection action to be filed against his former client for a debt that Long testified was
unreasonable. By his own testimony, Long did not have a non-frivolous factual basis to
bring the action.
Long argues that he had a legal basis to bring his debt collection action. He
argues that he had a claim for fees earned for the work he performed after the free
consultation, and would have had a contractual basis for enforcing the signed flat fee
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agreement. Long Br. at 40-41. Had Long brought a collections action for the fees he
actually earned, it's likely that the OPC would not have charged Rule 3.1. Long,
however, caused a collections case to be filed against Shepard for the entire flat fee
amount of $6,600, plus interest and fees, six months after his client fired him. Long
admitted to the Screening Panel that the fee he tried to collect was "absolutely not"
reasonable, thus Long lacked a non-frivolous basis in fact to bring his claim, and the
Panel correctly interpreted and applied Rule 3.1. Shepard R. 000213.
C.

Rule 5.3(a)

Rule 5.3(a) required Long to make "reasonable efforts" to ensure that his firm
had in effect measures giving reasonable assurance that Scheeler's conduct complied
with the Rules of Professional Conduct. Rule 5.3(a), Rules of Professional Conduct.
There was testimony at the Screening Panel that Scheeler's employment agreement
with Long prohibited Scheeler from holding himself out as a lawyer and from engaging
in conduct which would constitute the practice of law. Nelson Transcript, p.7. That
testimony shows that when Scheeler was hired, Long took measures to ensure that
Scheeler's conduct would be compatible with Long's ethical obligations. That finding
does not necessarily end the analysis under Rule 5.3(a), and the Panel had other
evidence before it which supports the Rule violation.
The facts before the Panel which support the Rule 5.3(a) violation are fully
discussed in Argument Section I of this Brief. Essentially, Long hired Scheeler in
February 2007 and set out in an employment agreement that Scheeler's conduct
needed to comply with the Rules of Professional Conduct. In early May 2007, Long
received correspondence from Joseph Orifici, which referenced Long's client, Merritt.
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According to Long's own fee agreement, Merritt was not even his client at that point.
There is no evidence in the record that Long began, at that point, to investigate why
Orifici believed he was representing Merritt. As Long was the only attorney in his office,
it would have been reasonable at that time to take measures to ascertain the conduct
his non-lawyer staff was engaging in with Merritt. Instead, Long did nothing, and then,
two weeks later, relied upon Scheeler's improper conduct in correspondence to the
prosecutor in Merritt's protective order violation case. By that point, Long knew that
someone had been conducting legal work for Merritt (negotiating a division of property),
Long knew it wasn't him, and Long used that information in the protective order case.
Long states in his Brief that Scheeler was terminated because he failed comply with the
terms of his employment agreement, which limited and controlled his conduct. Long Br.
at 43. Before the Screening Panel, however, Long testified that Scheeler quit in
November 2007. Nelson Transcript p.2. Rule 5.3(a) requires attorneys to be pro-active
in their supervision of non-lawyer employees. See In re Farmer, 950 P.2d 713 (Kan.
1997) (lawyer has affirmative duty to ensure that non-lawyer assistants do not give legal
advice to clients). Long failed to take any steps to correct what he knew was Scheeler's
ongoing improper conduct.
Rule 5.3(a) does not, of course, seek to discipline attorneys when non-lawyer
members of their staff engage in misconduct which is completely concealed from the
lawyer. For example, the OPC has reviewed cases where a firm's non-lawyer
bookkeeper siphons money out of a trust account, despite the attorney's efforts to
ensure that the firm's accounting was handled properly. We have reviewed other cases
where paralegals meet with clients and engage in the unauthorized practice of law,
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outside the view of their attorney supervisor, concealing their actions for their own
financial gain. When an attorney in such cases had reasonable measures in place to
ensure ethical conduct, and an employee ignored those measures and concealed their
wrongdoing, the OPC did not believe the conduct rose to the level of 5.3(a) violation.
That is not the situation in the present case.
Long may have initially taken measures to ensure Scheeler's compliance with the
Rules, but within a few months of employment Long knew Scheeler was engaging in
misconduct. Long did not take steps, in this case, to reaffirm for Scheeler what his
ethical

obligations

were, and

he relied

upon

Scheeler's

misconduct

in

his

correspondence to the prosecutor. The Panel correctly interpreted and applied Rule 5.3
in light of the evidence in the record.
D.

Rule 5.5(a)

Rule 5.5(a) prohibits an attorney from engaging in the unauthorized practice of
law or assisting another in doing so. Rule 5.5(a), Rules of Professional Conduct. Long
argues that Scheeler conducted a mediation, conduct which does not rise to the level of
the unauthorized practice of law. Long Br. at 44-45. The evidence in the record
establishes that Scheeler's conduct went well beyond merely conducting a mediation.
Long knew that Scheeler conducted a mediation and then prepared a Settlement
Agreement. That Agreement, which was provided to opposing counsel, negotiated a
property division between Merritt and Smith (who was represented by counsel). Long
conceded at the Exception hearing that this conduct constituted the practice of law.
Nelson Ruling at 7. As is discussed in the Rule 5.3(a) analysis, given the timeline
established by the evidence, Long knew of these actions and attempted to use them to
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his client's benefit in the protective order violation matter. Though a non-lawyer may
conduct mediations, Scheeler's conduct went beyond the scope of a mediator and
crossed the line into the unauthorized practice of law. When an attorney fails to
supervise their non-lawyer staff, and the attorney knows that the non-lawyer has
engaged in the unauthorized practice of law, the attorney violates Rule 5.5(a). See In re
Edens, 544 S.E.2d 627 (S.C. 2001) (lawyer allowed office manager to conduct real
estate closing and obtain client signature in his absence). The Panel correctly
interpreted and applied Rule 5.5(a).
E.

Rule 8.4(a)

Because the other Rule violations were proper, the Panel correctly found a
violation of Rule 8.4(a) in each case.
V.

The Screening Panel's Disciplinary Recommendations for Violations of
Rules 7.1 and 7.5(d) Should Not Be Reduced.
In the Shepard Complaint, the Panel found violations of Rules 1.5(a), 3.1, 7.1,

and 7.5(d). In his Brief, Long tries to separate the 7.1 and 7.5(d) violations from the
1.5(a) and 3.1 violations to conduct an analysis of the appropriate level of discipline
under the Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions. That analysis of the Rules is
flawed, and the Panel based the discipline upon all the Rule violations found in the
case. Long argues that the appropriate level of discipline is an admonition, which is
what he received in the Shepard Complaint, Thus, no further argument or analysis on
that matter is warranted.
In the Henriod Complaint, the Panel found violations of Rules 1.5(a), 7.1, and
7.5(d) and recommended a public reprimand. Long argues that the appropriate level of
discipline for the 7.1 and 7.5(d) violations is an admonition. In applying the Standards
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for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions to a particular case, the Panel does not separate each
rule violation into individual levels of discipline. Rather, the most severe rule violation
will generally establish the appropriate level of discipline for the case. It would be
improper to separate the 7.1 and 7.5(d) violations from the 1.5(a) violation in the
Henriod Complaint, and the total recommendation should remain intact.
VI.

The Screening Panel Recommendations Result From the Proper
Application of the Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability. Should the
Court Believe There Were Unintended Results, They Are Properly
Addressed Here, and not Through Additional Proceedings Before the
Committee or District Court.
The OPC acknowledges that Screening Panels may reach different disciplinary

recommendations when analyzing similar factual patterns in separate cases. This is,
really, no different from the district court system, where disparate outcomes may be
reached in factually similar cases by different judges. Even when examining cases
before the same judge, facts are never identical, and though consistency is a goal,
outcomes will be shaped by the facts unique to each case.
In the Long cases, the OPC recommended that the Panels direct the OPC to
prepare and file a formal complaint in the district court. See Nelson Screening Panel
Memo, p.12; Shepard Screening Panel Memo, p.7; Henriod Screening Panel Memo,
p. 14. Had the Panels followed that recommendation, these matters would have been
consolidated into one district court filing, with a singular outcome. Instead the Panel
heard the three cases and issued the challenged Recommendations. Long challenges
the Panel's Recommendations because the allegations were factually similar, implicated
similar Rules, but had different disciplinary outcomes.
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Each case involved different parties, different facts and different circumstances.
In each case the Panel was free to weigh the credibility of Long's testimony differently.
Long has failed to demonstrate that based upon the Panel's findings in each case, the
conclusions are internally inconsistent. That Long received a reprimand in the Henriod
Complaint does not mean that the admonition he received in the Shepard complaint is
suspect. Indeed, the cases were different, the evidence before the Panel was different,
the Panel had to evaluate the significance of the evidence in each distinct case, and
apply that evidence to the Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions.
Should the Court believe that there are inconsistencies which were not intended
by the operation of the Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability, the Court, of course,
has the authority under the Utah Constitution to review this matter and issue its final
determination for Long's discipline.
CONCLUSION
Long has failed to fulfill his obligation to marshal the record evidence before the
Court. Nevertheless, Long's arguments fail on review. The record in each of the three
underlying disciplinary cases is full of evidence which the Screening Panel considered
for its disciplinary determinations. Long filed Exceptions to the Panel's determinations,
which were heard by the Committee Chair and ruled upon. Long has been afforded the
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due process intended for low-level attorney discipline. The Rules were correctly
interpreted and applied, and the disciplinary conclusions, as set out by the Committee,
should stand.
DATED this Zo^tiay

of May, 2010
UTAH STATE BAR:

Adam C. Bevis
Assistant Counsel
Office of Professional Conduct
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the Z_i clay of May, 2010, I caused to be mailed via
United States mail, first class postage pre-paid, two true and correct copies of the
foregoing BRIEF OF THE APPELLEE to:
John A. Snow
Alex B. Leeman
VanCott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy
36 South State Street, Suite 1900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1478
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ADDENDUM

Kathenne A. Fox (5278}
General Counsel
Utah State Bar
645 South 200 East
Sail Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone- (801)297-7047
Fax (801)531-0650

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
)

In Re:
Utah State Bar

)
)
)

Petition to Amend the Rules of
Lawyer Discipline and Disability

)

Petitioner.

)
)

THE UTAH STATE BAR by and through its General Counsel Katherine A. Fox
hereby petitions the Court to amend the Rules for Lawyer Discipline and Disability (the
"Rules"). The proposed changes encompass editing changes for clarity and internal
consistency as well as more substantive revisions to improve the disciplinary process.
For the Court's convenient reference, an addendum which accompanies this petition
contains a copy of the current Rules, a copy of the redline version of the Rules and a
copy of the final version of the Rules with the proposed modifications incorporated. The
proposed changes were posted foi several months on the Bars web site and member
comment was invited. As of the deadline of January 31. 2002 two comments were
submitted, both of which have been included in the addendum

BACKGROUND
The Utah Supreme Court approved the Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability
in May 1993 when the disciplinary system was modified to delegate authority to the
state district courts instead of the Board of Bar Commissioners (the "Commission") in
order to adjudicate formal complaints against attorneys

1

In recommending adoption of

the Rules to the Court, the Court's Advisory Committee on the Rules of Professional
Conduct coniemplated that the disciplinary rules would need revision fronri time to time,
and in fact, the Rules have been periodically amended/
Beginning in 1998 James C. Jenkins, President of the Bar, met with Office of
Professional Conduct Senior Counsel Billy L Walker to explore the feasibility of several
amendments to streamline and decrease the cost of the disciplinary process. The
Office of Professional Conduct (uOPC"j had previously reviewed the Rules and arrived
at a number of suggestions to clarify aspects of the disciplinary process, address
problems relating to the 1993 Rules that had surfaced, incorporate selected language
taken from the ABA Model Rules of Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement and generally
make the disciplinary process .more efficient. In the spring of 2000, the Commission
discussed the suggested changes, but required additional information to make a final

The new Rules became effective July 1, 1993 and replaced the former Proceduies of Discipline
2

Since 1993, tne following Rules have been amended as follows Rule 3 (Etnics and Discipline
Committee^ to and provisions foi alternates on screening panels on Marcn 26. 1995, Rule 3 (Etnics and
Discipline Committee; tc increase tne numoer of alternates serving on screening panels on Decembei 25.
1997 Rule 3 (Etnics ano Discipline Committee) to increase numoer of screening pane! puonc members
on Jaruary 26, -999, Rule 3 ''Ethics anc Discipline Committee; to cnange tne Office of Professional
Conduc Annua' Repor oje caie or May '5, 2000 Ruie 4 ^Office o{ Piofessiona. Conojc Counsel/to
cnange titles of Office of ^ncrney Discipline to Office o Professional Condjc and Cnief Disciplinary
Cojr.se tc Senio- Co_rse or Decembe' 2c "997 anc ^ori £ "995: anc Rule 8 Pencci: Asssssnen* o*
_3^':'e's :c 'eirsia'e c-unojen' Tee fo~ suspencec auomevs or A.pn '3 '999

Determination

In tne fall Bai Piesident David Nuffer apuointed a Rules Review

Subcomiriittee (the "Subcommittee"; consisting of Commissioners John A Adams,
Debra J Mooie and C Dane Nolan to review the Rules and mare more comprehensu/e
recommendaiions to the Commission ioi overall impiovement

The Subcommittee met

numeious times, and at times included Billy L Walkei, James B Lee, Ethics and
Disciplinary Committee chair and R Clark Arnold Ethics and Disciplinary Committee
v/ice-cnair in several of those meetings Tne proposed modifications to the Rules wmch
appear below weie approved after extensive review and discussion at regu.ahy
scheduled Commission meetings on June B, July <*, July 27, August 2 ^ and Decemuei
7,2001
Tne contents of this petition are organized to reflect how the foui components of
the Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability appear in the Utan Code

Thus proposed

changes to the "table of contents," the "compiler's notes" and the "summary," all of
which precede the Rules in the Code, are listed before the proposed amendments to
the Rules

Where proposed revisions have been based in whole or in pan on the ABA

Mode! Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enfoicement, the same has been noted

Finally

care has been taken to identify proposed changes which are, or even could be
considered to be, substantive m nature and in such cases, an asterisk appears befce
tne particulai Rule

THE TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTION
Rule 30 (Costs)
*

Rule 30: Editing change reflects a proposed substantive change in Rule 30.

The title of Rule 30 in the table of contents has been modified to add "attorneys fees" to
evidence the proposed change that grants the district court discretion to award attorney
fees against a respondent when the defense was without merit and not asserted in good
faith. (For a more complete description of the changes, see the explanation below
under Rule 30 in the Rules section.)
Rule 32 (Failure to answer charges)
*

Rule 32(a) and (b): Editing change in the table of contents reflects the proposed

addition of a new Rule. Rule 32(a) provides that at the screening panel level, a
respondent's failure to answer charges which have been filed constitutes an admission
of the allegations but only if actual notice was received. Rule 32(b) provides that failure
to appear before a screening panel hearing, after receipt of actual notice, constitutes an
admission of the allegations. (For a more complete description of the changes, see the
explanation below, under Rule 32 in the Rules section.)

THE COMPILER'S NOTES SECTION
Compiler's Notes: No changes

THE SUMMARY SECTION
Summary: Editing changes only; adds numeric equivalents for the words
"three" and "four."

THE RULES OF LAWYER DISCIPLINE AND DISABILITY

Rule 1 (Purpose, authority, scope and structure
of lawyer discipline and disability)
Rule 1(a): No changes.
Rule 1(b): Editing changes only; spells out the abbreviated word "art." and
substitutes the word "section" in lieu of the section symbol (§) which appears in the
current Rule.
Rule 1(c): No changes.
Rule 1(d): No changes.

Rule 2 (Definitions)
Rule 2(a): No changes.
Rule 2(b): No changes
Rule 2(c): No changes.
Rule 2(d): Editing changes only: adds "OPC" to the definition of "complainant"
in matters where OPC determines to open an investigation based on inforrnatior; it
receives. Trie change is needed 10 codify what already occurs in practice arid provide

consistency with current Rule 10(a)(1) which authorizes, in part, OPC counsel to inmate
an informal complaint against an attorney for misconduct
Rule 2(e): Editing changes only adds a definition for OPC "Senioi Counsel"
and furthei refines the definition of "OPC Counsel "
Rule 2(f): No changes
Rule 2(g): No changes
*

Rule 2(h): Both substantive and editing change, provides a definition for the

currently existing "NOIC,J or "Notice of Informal Complaint" referenced in Rule 10
Rule 2(i): Editing changes only, replaces the term "OPC" with the word "Office"
since the "Office" referred to throughout the Rules is the Bar's Office of Professional
Conduct. Change also re-numbers subsection to accommodate new suosection (h)
above
Rule 2(j): Editing change only; re-numbers subsection to accommodate new
subsection (h) above
Rule 2(k): Editing change only, re-numbers subsection to accommodate new
subsection (h) above.

Rule 3 (Ethics and discipline committee)
Rule 3(a): Editing changes only, spells out the numoer "26" and provides
numeric equivalents for numerous speiled-out numbers for clarification purposes
Rule 3(a)(1)

No changes

Rule 3(b):

Editing changes only, replaces the word "base'' vv/ith the more

appropriate word "basis" and clarifies that the "chair1" referenced in this subsection is the
chair of the Ethics and Discipline Committee versus a screening panel chair.
Rule 3(c):

Editing changes only; clarifies that the "vice chair" referenced in this

subsection is the vice chair of the Ethics and Discipline Committee versus a screening
panel vice chair.
*

Rule 3(dJ: Both substantive and editing changes; substantive amendments

provide that when a screening panel of four members is convened, the chair or s/ice
chair of a Ethics and Discipline screening panel shall act as a tie-breaker. Currently, the
number for a quorum is four and consists of three members of the Bar and one public
member. There are no tie breaking procedures and OPC has had at least one instance
where a screening panel voted in a tie which resulted in no decision. The proposed
revisions also change the number of Committee members required to constitute a
quorum to three persons consisting of two Bar members and one public member. The
number three instead of five is suggested because it is easier to convene a smaller
number of people than a larger number.. Editing changes also correct the misspelling of
the word "or" to "of," make the word "member" plural where needed, and provide
numeric equivalents for numerous spelled out numbers

Finally, while proposed

revisions do not increase the actual number of public members on the Ethics and
Discipline Committee, the four screening panels are now organized with two public
memDers instead of one.

Ruie 3(d)(1): Editing changes only, capitalizes the first letter of the word
"committee" in three different places to make clear reference is being made to the
Ethics and Discipline Committee outlined in Rule 3.
Rule 3(e): Editing changes only; proposed revisions substitute the abbreviated
term "OPC" for the word disciplinary" which is more consistent with the prior name
change of "Office of Attorney Discipline" to "Office of Professional Conduct.3' In addition,
reference to the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct has been made because those
rules provide the basis upon which an attorney should conform his or her conduct.
*

Rule 3(f): Substantive change; this subsection has been deleted and

reformulated into other more detailed subsections which appear below as Rule 3(f;(1)
through (4). Rule 3(f) as currently written allows any party or a screening pane! to
request under seal of the court a subpoena allowing discovery prior to the filing of a
formal complaint (with a five day notice generally being issued), One reason OPC
seldom uses this Rule is that it is unduly cumbersome. When used by the respondent
or complainants, however, the informal disciplinary process is often diverted to
irrelevant issues and the entire process is delayed,
*

Rule 3(f)(1): Substantive change; the proposed amendments grant the power to

OPC counsel to issue investigatory subpoenas with the approval of the chair of the
Ethics and Discipline Committee. The change and the language is, in large pan, based
on Ruie 14 of the Model Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement promulgated by the
ABA's Center for Professional Responsibility. These changes are sougnt to improve
efficiency and ;c< ;educe the cost of the investigatory process in discipline mailers.
Cjreniiy, pno? LC fiiing a forma1 oomp:ain: for good cause shown subpoenas car be
I

obtained by any party who files a petition under seal with the district court. When used,
this process can slow down case processing by allowing complainants and/or
respondents to divert the informal disciplinary process to tangential issues. The
proposed language is feasible because prior to the filing of formal changes, the
disciplinary process is more an administrative-type investigation. Investigatory
subpoenas only will be obtained when independent evidence is needed (e.g., bank
records) that the respondent or complainant is unwilling to provide to OPC or where
there are unwilling witnesses who refuse to testify. As a safeguard OPC counsel may
only use the subpoena power with the approval of the Ethics and Discipline Committee
Chair.
*

Rule 3(f)(2) and (3) and (4): Substantive changes; the Utah Rules of Civil

Procedure and in particular, Rule 45 governing subpoenas, witness fees and mileage
reimbursement, will-now apply under these proposed revisions. Enforcement of the
subpoena can be sought through the district court. The respondent or complainant is
protected in that he or she is accorded the right to file a motion to quash the subpoena if
its appropriateness or validity is questioned.
*

Rule 3(g): Substantive and editing changes; editing changes substitute the term

"OPC" for the word "disciplinary" in three places for reason stated above in proposed
changes to Rule 3(e). The reference to word "time" should be plural (i.e., "times") to
make sentence grammatically correct. A more substantive revision also inserts the
phrase "during a [screening panel] hearing" after the phrase "screening panel" and
before the phrase "the respondent . . . ." in the last sentence of the first paragraph. ~Ti!S
is io c;arif\ ^r,a: \c areazly impiicr in oraoooe: ma; iue responoen; has the righ: ic be

present during a hearing if OPC is present. A proposed editing amendment also inserts
the word "the" after the word " o f and before the word "subsequent" in the second to last
line of the second paragraph for language clarity. Finally, editing-type changes add the
numeric equivalent of the word "three."
Rule 3(h):

Editing changes only; substitutes the term "OPC" for the word

"Office" for consistency reasons. A proposed amendment also changes the word
"ethical" to "ethics" (as it modifies "opinion") as it is an informal ethics advisory opinion
that is being referenced.

Rule 4 fOPC counsel)
Rule 4(a):

Editing changes only; deletes the redundant word "staff" and

substitutes the word "payment'5 for the word "profit" since attorneys in OPC should be
barred from engaging in private practice which could involve conflicts of interest rather
than be prohibited from engaging in legal service for profit which implies an income
analysis.
Rule 4(b) and 4(b)(1) and (2) and (3):

Editing changes only; adds the modifier

"the" in Rule 4(b) and substitutes the term "OPC" for the word "Office" in Rule 4(b)(1)
and (2) and (3). In subsection 4(b)(3) for consistency purposes, the revision also
references the proposed changes in Rule 10, i.e., "for each matter not covered in Rule
10" brought to the attention of OPC.
Rule 4(b)(3)(A):

No changes.

Rule 4(b)(3)(B):

He changes.

Rule 4(b)(3)(C):

No changes.
]0

Rule 4(b)(3)(D): Editing change only; makes clear what is already implicit, i.e.,
an CPC petition to transfer attorneys to disability status must be filed in the district
court.
*

Rule 4(b)(4): Substantive change; defines the duties of OPC counsel to include

prosecuting disciplinary matters and proceedings for transfer to disability status before
any court (which would include the federal courts).
*

Rule 4(b)(5): Substantive changes; more accurately details that OPC should

"attend" Character and Fitness Committee proceedings rather than actually "represent"
OPC at these proceedings since attendance is needed to gather information for
subsequent representation of OPC in connection with readmission cases in the disirict
court under Rule 25. Also, changes specify that OPC may appear before Emv court in
matters of reinstatement and readmission in order to mirror the proposed changes in
Rule 4(b)(4) above.
*

Rule 4(b)(6): Both substantive and editing changes; formally adds to the duties

of OPC counsel the supervision of volunteer attorneys who monitor the practice of
respondents who have been placed on probation. Editing change aiso expressly allows
OPC counsel to "appoint" as well as "employ" these volunteer attorneys as these
volunteer attorneys are not paid for their oversight responsibilities.
Rule 4(b)(7): No changes.
Rule 4(b)(8): Editing change only; more clearly delineates that any discipline
which has been imposed on an attorney, and of which notice is provided to other
licensing jurisdictions, must be public discipline. Currently, Rule 4(b)(8) reads that other

licensing jurisdictions are notified when a Utah attorney is suspended or disbarred or
subject to other public discipline.
Rule 4(b)(9): Editing change only; more clearly delineates that when OPC
seeks to impose reciprocal discipline, that any discipline imposed by the other licensing
jurisdiction must be public discipline, e.g., a suspension or disbarment.
*

Rule 4(b)(10): Substantive and/or editing change; strikes the seemingly

superfluous phrase "in other respects."
*

Ruie 4(b)(11): Substantive and/or editing change; as this Rule currently reads it

would appear that OPC is required to maintain a permanent record of "transcripts of all
proceedings," implying that transcripts should be produced in all proceedings so that a
permanent record can be maintained. The proposed change would seem to indicate
that only in cases where a transcript is actually produced is OPC under such an
obligation.
Ruie 4(b)(12): Editing change only; adds numeric equivalent of the word
"seven."
Ruie 4(b)(12)(A): Editing changes only; replaces the word "office1, with the term
"OPC" and in the word "respondent/1 replaces the upper case "R" with a lower case "r.M
Also, this subsection was not specifically numbered before and has now become
subsection "(A),"
Rule 4fb)(12)(B): Editing changes only; replaces the word "office" with the term
"OPC" and in the word "expungement," replaces the upper case "E' witn a lower case
'e' fo: consisiencv purposes. Also, this subsection was not specifically numbered
before anc n no* nas oecome suosection " ' 3 , "

*

Rule 4(b)(13): Substantive change; expressly allows OPC to publish results of

all disciplinary proceedings (while maintaining the confidentiality of respondents subject
to private discipline) in the Uiah Bar Journal which is consistent with the Utah Supreme
Court's decision in the Pendleton case/
Rule 4(b)(14): Editing change only; replaces the word "office'1 with the term
"OPC" for consistency purposes.
*

Rule 4(c): Substantive change; this new subsection expressly subjects former

OPC counsel to Rule 1.11 of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct concerning
successive govemment and private employment. The proposed change disqualifies
former OPC counsel from representing in disciplinary proceedings any such lawyer who
was previously investigated or prosecuted.

Rule 5 (Expenses)
Rule 5(a): No changes.
Rule 5(b): Editing changes only; replaces the phrase "OPC counsel" to "Senior
Counsel" to more accurately reflects that OPC's Senior Counsel rather than a staff
attorney should prepare that office's budget.

" See Ga— W ^endlgion ^iainiiff and Appellee v. Uiah Stair: Sar. ei a!.. 'S P.3d 1230 'Ut 2000, whe's
a defamation action ansinc- i r orr. trie DUDiicaiion o~ Gs;aiis in the Uiah Bar journa- o' trie plaintiff's, inisrirrdiscipiiriarv susnens'or was oi^missed DV this Cojr:.

Rule 6 (Jurisdiction)
Rule 6(a):

Editing changes; clarifies that OPC's and the district court's

jurisdiction extends to formerly admitted Utah lawyers for acts that violate the rules of
any disciplinary authority where the lawyer was licensed at the time of committing the
act. The change codifies the intent and understanding that attorneys are subject to
Utah discipline for alleged misconduct in other states. Editing changes also include
replacing the word "office" with the term "OPC" and adding the modifier "Supreme"
before "Court."
*

Rule 6(b):

Substantive change; while full-time judges are still only accountable

to OPC for conduct that occurred prior to their taking of office, after leaving office a
judge who is also a lawyer will now expressly be subject to OPC for any misconduct that
occurred while the lawyer was a judge if the misconduct would have been grounds for
lawyer discipline. Currently, if the Utah Supreme Court makes a final determination
about a judge's misconduct after the judge left office, even though the miisconduct was
grounds for lawyer discipline, OPC has no jurisdiction. Pursuant to a. July 2001 letter
from the late Senator Pete Suazo to Chief Justice Richard C. Howe and the Judicial
Council, the Legislature was concerned that when a judge is removed from office, it did
not automatically follow that the judge's license to practice law was also affected.
*

Rule 6(c);

Substantive change; clarifies that OPC's jurisdiction extends to part-

time judges ior acts outside of their judicial capacity. The current Rule doss not
specifically distinguish full-time incumbent judges who cannot ha\>e private legal
practices from part-time incumbent judges 'who can engage in sucn practice.

Rule 7 (Roster of lawyers)
Rule 7: Editing changes only; the change from the phrase "OPC counsel" to the
word "Ear" acknowledges that while OPC is the particular office of the Bar that at times
needs ready access to the information set forth in this Rule, it is not OPC that collects
and maintains this information. In fact, as is the case with most integrated or unified bar
associations the Bar's membership record database is maintained by the-Bar's financial
and licensing office. For confidentiality reasons consistent with these Rules, Bar
policies differentiate between private and public information, and access to private
information is substantially limited within and without the Bar. No private information is
disclosed absent certain circumstances such as a decision by a court ordering the Bar
to release the confidential information pursuant to a subpoena.

Rule 8 (Periodic assessment of lawyers)
Rule 8(a): No changes.
Rule 8(b): Editing changes; minor revision spells out the amount of $100 in
writing. In addition, the term "Board of Commissioners" is replaced by the word "Bar"
since the Board other than setting policies, is not involved in the administrative function
of collecting licensing fees or suspending attorneys for nonpayment Finally, Rule 8(b)
now specifies that the Bars Executive Director shall give notice to lawyers of their
suspension for nonpayment at their designated mailing address on record at the Bar.
The designated mailing address is the address lawyers specify on the licensing form to
which they want their mail sent. Currently, the Rule merely states thai the Bar shall g i ^

notice al the "address on record" but the Bar collects both home and business
addresses

Rule 9 (Grounds for discipline)
Rule 9: Ho changes.
Rule 9(a): No changes.
Rule 9(b): Editing change; proposed amendment strikes the word "or."
Rule 9(c): Editing change; proposed punctuation change reflects that
subsection (c) is no longer the last Rule 9 subsection in a series and accommodates the
addition of new subsections (d), (e) and (f).
*

Rule 9(d) and (e) and (f): Substantive changes; OPC often has a difficult time

obtaining information relating to: (1) a lawyer's conviction of a crime; (2) a lawyers
public discipline in another jurisdiction; and (3) a lawyer's violation of the Rules of
Judicial Conduct while the lawyer is serving as a judge. New subsections (d) and (e)
within this Rule provide that a lawyer's failure to notify OPC of the enumerated
misconduct is in and of itself a ground for discipline. The proposed revisions are, in
large part, based upon a similar California disciplinary rule and are needed because on
a prima facia basis, these enumerated circumstances adversely reflect upon a lawyer's
fitness to practice law in accordance with the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct.

Rule 10 (Prosecution and appeals)
Rule 10(a): Mo changes.
Rule 10;a;.;ii: Nc changes

providing that a person who files a complaint against an attorney must not only have his
or her signature notarized (which is the current requirement) but also must verify that
the information contained in the informal complaint is accurate was prompted at the
urging of Utah Senator Terry R. Spencer. Senator Spencer, who is an active member
of the Bar, met with the Commission and expressed his concerns about frivolous
attorney discipline complaints filed by disgruntled clients and others. While Senator
Spencer suggested a number of ways to reduce on the number of frivolous complaints
such as requiring the complainant to post a bond, the Commission believes that adding
the verification language was a reasonable compromise to address Senator Spencers
concerns and to protect the purpose and integrity of the attorney misconduct complaint
process, if OPC initiates an investigation as permitted by Rule 4(b) in conjunction with
Rule 10, this verification is not required since OPC may not have personal knowledge of
the misconduct but instead, may learn of it from other sources (such as the newspaper).
The term ,lOPC" is also substituted for the word "office" in the third line to be consistent
with the proposed amended definition in Rule 2(h).
Rule 10(a)(3): No changes.
Rule 10(a)(4): Editing change only; in order to more accurately caption this
subsection's content, Rule 10(a)(4):s title has been changed from "OPC counsel" to
"Notice of informal complaint." The term "professional" [counsel] has also been
replaced by the term "OPC" [counsel] for accuracy.
Rule 10(a)(5): Bailing changes only; the numbers 20 and 30 have been spelled
out.

*

Rule 10(a)(6): Both substantive and editing changes; proposed changes

embody the idea that the dismissal of disciplinary cases should be based on probability,
not possibility. The amendments recognize that it is a waste of resources to investigate
and prosecute cases which are more likely than not to result in ultimate dismissal. In
addition to complaints which are frivolous, unintelligible and unsupported by facts,
complaints which are barred by the applicable statute of limitations or which are more
adequately addressed in another forum should be dismissed.4 These iatiertwo
concepts are new. Informal complaints which OPC declines to prosecute should also
be dismissed. This proposed addition codifies OPC's current practice of dismissing
complaints similar to the way screening panels are authorized to dismiss cases. Finally
the proposed amendments clarify that the complainant may appeal all dismissals which
occur without a hearing to the chair of the Ethics and Discipline Committee. The
remainder of the changes are minor in nature and are proposed for editing clarification
and consistency.
Rule 10(b): No changes.
Rule 10(b)(1): Ho changes.
Rule 10(b)(2): Editing changes only; spells out the number "14" and provides
numeric equivalents for the numbers "six" and "five."
Rule 10(b)(3): No changes.
Rule 10(b)(4): No changes.
Rule 1 0(b)(5): No changes.
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Rule 10(b)(5)(A) and (3) and (C): No changes.
Rule 10(b)(5)(D): Editing changes only; adds the numeric equivalent of the
number "ten."
*

Rule 10(b)(5)(E):

Substantive cnange; this new subsection adds another choice

that a disciplinary screening panel can make after a hearing. Currently, the Ethics and
Discipline Committee only has the authority to issue private admonitions. Under this
new provision the Ethics and Discipline Committee would be given the authority to issue
oublic reprimands in addition to private admonitions. Under the current sanctions
standards the factual basis for a private admonition and a pubiic reprimand is
essentially the same with the difference being the level of harm to the client, the legal
profession, or the administration of justice. (See Rule 4.4 and 4.5 of the Standards for
Imposing Lawyer Sanctions.) The change will allow the expedited resolution of similar
cases because it will eliminate the need to file formal complaints in the district court on
those cases that are only slightly above the standards for an admonition. Tnis revision
will also allow OPC to avoid more expensive formal proceedings when the respondent
is willing to stipulate to a public reprimand and where an admonition does not
adequately address the conduct. As a practical matter, screening panels rarely, if at all,
vote a matter "formal" (i.e., find^probabie cause to send a case to the district court)
unless they believe the violation warrants suspension or disbarment. This is because
the time and expense required at the district court level is considerable, and it is often
difficult to justify the imposition of a "mere" puolic reprimand
Rule 10(b)(5)(F):

Editing change only: re-numbers this subsection

commensu-aie Mir toe acdmor of nevv suDsec;ion

-OI'L/O/E,

abo^e

r:uie 10(b)(6): Editing change only; adds the numeric equivalent for the number
"five/1
Rule 10(b)(7): No changes.
*

Rule 10(c): Substantive change; adds "public reprimands' to this subsection to

provide consistency with the proposed new subsection (10)(b)(5)(E) above which would
allow the Ethics and Discipline Committee to issue public reprimands. Minor editing
change also spells out the number "10."

Rule 11 (Proceedings subsequent to finding of_probable cause)
Rule 11(a): No changes.
Rule 11 (b): Editing change only; expressly states what is allowed under law:
OPC and the respondent may stipulate to a change in venue under current law (Utah
Code § 78-13-9).
Rule 11 (c): Editing changes only; replaces the word "Office" with the term
"OPC" and the term "USB" with the word "Bar" for consistency purposes.
Rule 11(d): No changes.
*

Rule 11 (d)(1): Substantive change; Rule 11(d)(1) currently reads to permit

either OPC or a respondent to file a notice of change requestma reassignment to
another judge in the same - or different - district. The Commission's Subcommittee did
not want a respondent to avoid publicity relating to the disciplinary proceedings in the
district where ihe respondent practices The proposed chanqe therefore removes
OPC's and the respondent s option 10 request reassignment of the disciplinary matter to

Of

a different judge in another district There is also a minor editing change which adds the
numeric equivalent of the number "one/
Rule 11(d)(2):

Editing change only, spells out the number "SO."

Rule 11(d)(3):

Editing change only; adds the phrase "of the Supreme Court" in

order to modify "Chief Justice" for clarity and identification purposes.
Rule 11(d)(4):

Editing change only; replaces the lower case "a" to an upper

case 7\'J in the reference to "Rule 63a' contained in the title of this subsection.
Rule 11(e):

No changes.

Rule 11(f):

Editing changes; proposed amendment allows what is implicit in that

a district court can expedite a sanctions hearing. This subsection addresses what
happens after a court makes a finding of misconduct and provides that a sanctions
hearing should be held as soon as reasonably practicable and not more than thirty days
after the district court enters its findings of fact and conclusions of law. The intent of this
subsection is to ensure that the sanctions hearing is separate from the hearing if the
latter is needed for determining misconduct. However, because of the wording "as soon
as reasonably practicable," it is somewhat unclear whether the sanctions hearing can
be held the same day (i.e., in the afternoon) as the hearing for finding misconduct (LeM
in the morning). The amendment clearly states that the district court at its discretion
can hold a sanctions hearing immediately consecutive to the disciplinary proceeding on
the same day. Editing changes also spell out the number "30" and add the numeric
equivalem of trie number "five "
rr

Rule 11 i g j :

Suosiantive change; proposed amendment oroadens ihe currerv

Ruie ic -ecogn.ze me feci ina; cismc: COJ^S may a-sc enter oroers om' pm/aie CISCD-V,^

and that both private and public orders of discipline can be appealed to the Supreme
Court.

Rule 12 (Sanctions)
Rule 12: No changes.

Rule 13 (Immunity)
*

Rule 13(a): Substantive change; proposed amendment refines the current Rule

and in this subsection, differentiates between immunity in civil suits and immunity in
criminal proceedings. The change designates and extends immunity from civil suit to:
(1) special counsel appointed by the Court under Rule 17(f); (2) supervising attorneys
who monitor lawyers who have been placed on probation; and (3) trustees appointed by
a Court under Rule 27 who oversee the closure of a law practice of an attorney who has
been placed on disability status. The Rule currently provides immunity from lawsuits for
"statements made during the course of disciplinary proceedings" (comparing the latter to
judicial proceedings) and is provided to "participants, district courts, committee
members, and OPC counsel and staff." The current Rule fails, however, to specifically
include special counsel who* perform the identical work of OPC counsel, as well as
attorneys who supervise lawyers on probation and lawyer trustees. Although the term
"participants" may have been intended to cover these individuals, the amendment
makes it clearer. Minor editing changes also provide consistency in terminology
*

Rule 13(b):

Substantive change; this is a new addition which would allow a

disino", court,, upor no~Voe io and oons\derator, of the postior. of the orosecuting

authority, to grant a witness in a disciplinary proceeding immunity from criminal
prosecution. This change is patterned after the ABA's Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement
Model Rule 12 and will aid OPC's investigative efforts by allowing a reluctant witness in
fear of criminal prosecution to come forth to testify.

Rule 14 (Service)
Rule 14: No changes.

Rule 15 (Access to disciplinary information)
Rule 15(a): No changes.
*

Rule 15(a)(1): Substantive change; specifies that a respondent's waiver of

confidentiality must be in writing,
Rule 15(a)(2): No changes.
Rule 15(a)(3): Editing change only; replaces a period with a semicolon to reflect
a continuation of a series of subsections.
*

Rule 15(b): Substantive change; explicitly recognizes that the filing of a motion

or petition for interim suspension is a public proceeding absent the exception of
issuance of a protective order.
Rule 15(c) and (d): No changes.
Rule 15(e): Editing change; minor revisions tighten up the grammatical
construction of this subsection governing requests for nonpublic (confidential)
information.

Kule 15(e)(1): Editing changes only; minor revisions improve clarity and
readability.
Rule 15(e)(2): Editing changes only; minor revisions improve clarity and
readability.
*

Rule 15(f): Substantive change; proposed amendment states that respondents

shall be notified of requests for nonpublic information at their designated mailing
address rather than their business office address. As discussed above in Rule 3(b), the
designated mailing address is the address lawyers specify on the annual licensing form
to which they want their mail sent. The amendments also require that a respondent's
waiver to permit others to obtain nonpublic information must be in writing. The
remainder of the revisions are minor editing changes which improve clarity and
readability and spell out the number "21."
*

Rule 15(g): Both substantive and editing changes; editing changes improve

clarity and readability, substantive changes provide that any waivers of confidentiality
pertaining to subsection (e) above must be in writing.
Rule 15(g)(1) and (2) and (3); No changes.
*

Rule 15(h)(1) and (2): Substantive changes; proposed new provisions still allow

OPC counsel to disclose nonpublic information without notice to the respondent but pnly
under limited and specific circumstances when the disclosure is essential to the
furtherance of an ongoing OPC investigation. Without the ability to disclose selected
confidential information to potential witnesses in order to gain information in some
matters, OPC cannot complete its, inv'estiaations.

Rule 15(i): Editing changes only; capitalizes the first letter in the word "rules" as
it refers to the Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability.

Rule 16 (Dissemination of disciplinary information)
±

Rule 16(a): Substantive change, this subsection currently lists which notices of

disciplinary information must be transmitted to various disciplinary agencies, the public
and the courts. The proposed addition obligates OPC to transmit sucn notices to the
Judicial Conduct Commission if the subject of the discipline is a sitting or former judge.
The disciplinary notice which heretofore has been inadvertently omitted from this
subsection is "resignation with discipline pending" (which is tantamount to disbarment)
and this omission has been added with the proposed amendments.
*

Rule 16(b): Substantive change; the proposed amendment requires the

Executive Director of the Bar rather than the Administrative Office of the Courts f AOC")
to publish notices of disciplinary suspensions and disbarments as well as public
resignations with discipline pending and transfers to disability status. The change is
consistent with the Rule's original intent that such notice be given, but removes the
burden on the AOC pursuant to the AOC's request, in fact, insofar as the Bar has
ascertained, the AOC has never published these notices under the current Rule.
*

Rule 16(c): Substantive change; the proposed amendment requires the Bar's

Executive Director rather than the AOC to transmit notices of certain disciplinary
information to all Utah courts As is the case with the proposed changes in subsection
(b) above :he AOC nas reques:eo the Bar 10 iransmii these notices directly Changes

also add the inadvertently omitted disciplinary category of "resignation with discipline
pending" to the list.

Rule 17 (Additional rules of procedure)
Rule 17(a): Editing change only; minor revision is proposed to improve
readability and consistency.
Rule 17(b): No changes.
*

Ruie 17(c): Substantive and editing changes; the word "private" is eliminated to

correlate with the substantive changes proposed for Rules 10(b)(5)(E) and 10(c) which
give screening panels the authority to recommend public reprimands.
Rule 17(d): No changes.
Rule 17(e): No changes.
*

Rule 17(f); Substantive changes; proposed amendment expressly applies the

same procedures for handling attorney ethics complaints against Ear Commissioners
and OPC counsel as to members of the Ethics and Discipline Committee. The
proposed revisions also adopt the same grounds for dismissal of such complaints as the
grounds required for dismissal of all other attorney misconduct complaints. The
changes clarify that special counsel for handling such complaints is a lawyer other than
an OPC lawyer, that special counsel must be appointed by the Supreme Court, and that
special counsel shall report the results of the investigation to OPC. The proposed
changes in Rule 10(a)(6) dealing with dismissals of informal complaints have also been
incorporated intc this Rule for consistency purposes.

Rule 1 8 (Interim suspension for threat of harm)
*

Rule 18(a);

Substantive change; to comport with the Pendleton attorney

discipline decision, the proposed modification to this subsection states that "an action is
covered under this rule when the petition for interim suspension is filed.^
Rule 18(b):

Editing change only; minor grammatical revision replaces the word

"the51 to the word "an/ 1
Rule 18(b)(1): No changes.
Ruie 18(b)(2);

Editing changes only; proposed amendment replaces the worci

"office" with the term "OPC" for consistency purposes.
Ruie 18(c):

No changes.

Rule 18(d):

Editing change only; adds numeric equivalent of the number "two."

Rule 19 (Lawyers convicted of a crime)
*

Rule 19(a): Substantive change; this proposed new provision requires a lawyer

convicted of any crime to notify OPC in writing of that fact within 30 days after being
convicted. Heretofore, only crimes which adversely reflected on a lawyer's honesty,
trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects needed to be reported. The
current Rule leaves it in the hands of the convicted attorney to determine whether or not
a crime meets that standard. OPC believes it is in a belter position to make trial
decision.
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*

Rule 19(b): Both substantive and editing changes; proposed revisions comport

with new requirements in Rule 19(a) above for consistency purposes, including renumbering the subsection The more important substantive amendment requires that
an attorney report all crimes to OPC, and not just those crimes which "reflect adversely
on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer. . .."
*

Rule 19(c): Substantive change; to comport with the Pendleton disciplinary

opinion, this substantive revision states that an action is commenced under this Rule
when both the petition for interim suspension and the formal complaint are filed. 6
Proposed amendments also clarify that a respondent under the circumstances set forth
in Rule 19(c) is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing but may request an informal
hearing. This change is consistent with the provisions of current Rule 19 that state that
the district court shall place the respondent on interim suspension upon proof that the
respondent has been convicted of a crime which reflects adversely on the lawyer's
honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects, regardless of the
pendency of any appeal. The proposed change is also consistent with the current
provision in Rule 19 which states that a certified judgment of conviction constitutes
conclusive evidence that the respondent committed the crime. These provisions seem
to indicate as a whole that the hearing a respondent attorney is entitled to is not an
evidentiary hearing to attack the facts underlying the conviction In this regard, if a
hearing is to be held, it is to be held solely upon the issue of whether or not the crime
legally reflects adversely on me respondent's honesty, Trustworthiness or fitness as a
lawyer Editing change re-numbers this subsection.

Rule 19(d), (e). (f)5 (g) and (h): Editing changes only; proposed amendments
provide for re-numbering of subsections to comport with the addition of new subsection
(a) in Rule 19.

Rule 20 (Discipline bv consent)
±

Rule 20(a): Substantive change; proposed amendment clarifies that a

respondent proposing discipline by consent must waive the right to a screening panel
hearing. It also deletes the cumbersome requirement thai the proposed discipline by
consent first be submitted to the screening panel chair (as opposed to just the Ethics
and Discipline Committee Chair) before being presented to the Ethics and Discipline
Committee Chair for consideration. The remainder of changes are minor editing
revisions for consistency and clarity purposes.
Rule 20(b): Editing changes only; proposed minor revisions suggested for
clarity, readability and consistency purposes.
Rule 20(c): No changes.
Rule 20(c)(1): Editing changes only; minor revisions for consistency purposes.
Rule 20(c)(2) and (3) and (4): No changes.
Rule 20(d): No changes.
Rule 20(d)(1) and (2) and (3) and (4): No changes.
*

Rule 20(d)(5): Substantive change; the current Rule reads that the respondent

shall submit an affidavit consenting to imposition of the approved disciplinary sanction
and acknowledging tnat the materia! facts alleged are true. The modifying phrase "for
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purposes of discipline" has been added to the beginning of the sentence in subsection
(d)(5). OPC has had a number of cases where consents to discipline have been placed
in jeopardy because although a respondent was willing to acknowledge the facts for
purposes of disciplinary proceedings, he or she was not willing to acknowledge them for
other purposes, e.g., criminal prosecutions or pending civil suits., etc. The proposed
limitation should not affect a respondent's exposure in those other types of proceedings
since the standard of proof differs in each of the other proceedings. This change is
consistent with a similar provision in the ABA's Model Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary
Enforcement.
Rule 20(d)(5):
Rule 20(e):

No changes.

Editing changes only; the proposed changes in the other

subsections of Rule 20 make current subsection (e) inaccurate and unnecessary and if
therefore should be deleted.

Rule 21 (Resignation with discipline pending)
Rule 21(a):

Editing change; the current Rule provides that a respondent may

resign from the Bar prior to the adjudication of a pending complaint with the consent of
the Supreme Court and upon such terms as the Supreme Court may impose for the
protection of the public. The proposed amendment specifically states that a resignation
can be made only with the consent of the Supreme Court.
*

Rule 21(b)(1):

Substaniive change; consistent with the proposed amendment to

Rule 20(d/5) and for reasons discussed therein, respondents should be required to

30

admit for only the purposes of the disciplinary proceeding the facts upon which the
allegations of misconduct are based in order to resign with discipline pending
Rule 21(b)(2) and (3) and (4) and (5): \<io changes.
Rule 21(b)(6): Editing change only; proposed amendment specifies that in
order to resign with discipline pending, respondents must agree to comply with all the
Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability including Rule 26(b) regarding notices to
clients and return of clients' property. Rule 26(b) sets forth the exact requirements that
apply when a respondent winds up his or her legal practice.
Rule 21(b)(7): No changes.
Rule 21(c): Editing changes only; proposed change spells out equivalent of the
number "20" and adds the numeric equivalent of the number "ten,"
Rule 21(d): No changes.
Rule 21 (e): Editing changes only; proposed change specifies thai respondents
who resign with discipline pending must comply with Rule 25 governing re-admissions
to the Bar. The specification makes explicit what is already implicit: a resignation with
discipline pending is tantamount to disbarment.
*

Rule 21(f): Substantive changes; proposed subsection (f) is entirely new. Trie

proposed amendments allow an attorney to regjgn with discipline pending when the
allegations of legal misconduct, if proven, may not justify disbarment. In such cases,
the respondent must comply with requirements set forth in this subsection. The
requirements differ from those imposed by subsections (b) and (c) in that: (1; the
respondent need not admit thai the facts constitute grounds for discipline and that the

admittance is for purposes of the disciplinary proceedings only; and (2) the provisions
contained in subsection (c) do not apply.

Rule 22 (Reciprocal discipline)
±

Rule 22(a): Substantive change; the current Rule states that a lawyer admitted

to practice law in Utah shall promptly inform OPC that he or she has been publicly
disciplined by another regulatory body having disciplinary jurisdiction. The proposed
revision replaces the word "promptly" with a definitive time period of 30 days. The
remaining changes are minor editing changes.
Rule 22(b) and (b)(1):

No changes.

Rule 22(b)(2). (d) and (e): Editing changes only; proposed revision spells out
equivalent of the number "30" and more accurately rephrases "in all other aspects''
except as provided in [subsections] (c) and (d) above.

Rule 23 (Proceedings in which lawyer is declared to be
Incompetent or alleged to be incapacitated)
*

Rule 23(a):

Both substantive and editing changes; provides that in cases where

no guardian or legal representative has been appointed for a lawyer on disability status,
a copy of the court's order shall be served on the director of the institution to which the
lawyer has been committed.
Rules 23(b) and (c) and (d)(1)-(4);

No changes.

Rule 23(d)(5): Edmng changes only more appropriate sentence structure more
aocuiately states tnai the Bar rather than tne 3ai Examiners Commntee certifies
successful compleuon of the Bai examination foi admission to practice
Rule 23(d)(6) and (7):

No changes

Rule 2^ (Reinstatement following a
suspension of six months or less)

*

Rule 24: Substantive change, proposed amendmeni imposes new requirement

that a respondent file an affidavit with OPC stating that he or she has fully reimoursed
the Client Security Fund for amounts paid on account of the respondent s miscorcjm ir,
reinstatement cases following a suspension of six months or less

Eamng changes spell

out the equivalent of the number "1051 and provide the numeric equivalent of the numner
"six,"

Rule 25 (Reinstatement following a s u s p e n s i o n
of more than six months: readmission)
Rule 25(a): Edmng changes only, proposed amendments provide numenc
equivalents of various spelled out numbers
*

Rule 25(b):

Substantive changes, proposed amendment eliminates an advance

cost deposn for petitions for reinstatement to cover the anticipated costs of the
reinstatement proceeoing because this requirement has not been imposed in practios
Anotr.e r sjostamu/e tension requres a lespondent seehng ^ a m i s s i o n to recede 3
repo- anc r ecommenca:ion from the Bars Cnaracte" anc Fitness Committee Deice

fiiing a petition in the district court !\lo where is it specified in either the Rules
Governing Admission or the Rules for Lawyer Discipline and Disability whether the
petitioner should apply for readmission and undergo a character and fitness review
before or after filing a petition with the district court. The Commission, based on
recommendations from OPC and the Bar's Admission Committee, believes it makes
more sense to have the character and fitness evaluation readily available for the district
court's review in conjunction with the former attorney's petition. A further revision
makes clear that a petitioner is obligated to fulfill the remainder of admission
requirements (such as educational requirements and payment of fees) before being
eligible for admission pursuant to district court order.
Rule 25(c): No changes.
Rule 25(d): Editing changes; minor amendments spell ourtne number "30/'
Rule 25(e)(1) and (2) and (3) and (3)(A): No changes.
Rule 25(e)(3)(B): Editing change; minor amendment provides numeric
equivalent of the number "six."
Rule 25(e)(3)(C): No changes,
*

Rule 25 (e)(4): Substantive change; this subsection's proposed revisions

provide that a respondent who seeks readmission (after disbarment) must give OPC a
copy of the Bar's Character and Fitness Committee's report and recommendation The
changes also provide that a copy of the report should be forwarded IO the district court
assigned to the petition for readmission after the respondent files the petition. These
changes clarify tne oroer of some of me steps a respondent must lake in order io be
consice'ec fo: ''eadmission.

Rule 25(e)(5): No changes.
Rule 25(e)(6): Editing changes; provides numeric equivalenl for the spelled out
number "one."
Rule 25(e)(7): No changes.
*

Rule 25(e)(8): Substantive change; subsection (e)(8) which is new expressly

requires that a respondent fully reimburse the Client Security Fund for any amounts the
Bar has paid on account of the respondent attorney's misconduct.
Rule 25(f): Editing change; minor amendment adds spelled out word "sixty."
Rule 25(g): Editing changes; provides spelled out numeric equivalent of "90/
Rule 25(h): Editing changes; provides numeric equivalenl of ihe number "one."
Rule 25(1): No changes.
Rule 25(j): Editing changes; adds spelled out number "twenty."

Rule 26 (Notice of disability or suspension: return
of clients' property: refund of unearned fees)

Rule 26(a): Editing change only; minor revision adds spelled out equivalent of
the number "30."
Rule 25(b): Editing changes only; provides numeric equivalent of "six" and
spelled out equivalent of the number "20."
Rule 26(b)(1) through (6): Uo changes.
Rule 26(b)(7): Edmng change' provides spelled out equivalent of the number
"in."

Rule 26(d): Editing change; provides numeric equivalent of the numbei "six."
Rule 26(e): No changes

Rule 27 (Appointment of trustee to protect clients' interest when lawyer
disappears, dies, is suspended or disbarred, or is transferred to disability status)

Rule 27(a) and (b): No changes.
*

Rule 27(c): Substantive change; proposed amendment expressly provides

immunity for a person appointed under Rule 30 as a trustee the change is
commensurate with the proposed changes in Rule 13.

Rule 28 (Appeal by complainant)
Rule 28: Editing change; any dismissal, just not a "summary5' dismissal, may be
appealed under Rule 10(a)(6),

Rule 29 (Statute of limitations)
Rule 29; Editing change only; adds the numeric equivalent of spelled out
number "four."

Rule 30 (Costs and attorney fees)
±

Rule 30(a): Substaniu/e change; makes discretionary ratner than mandatory the

award of

COSTS

against a respondent when OPC prevails The proposed amendments

also g^nt me cojrt discretion xo aware atiomey fees against a respondent when me
oe^ense vvaL .viinoj* me r r or no: essenec ir. gooo faun Autnonzing OPC ic collect

attorney fees in successful cases may provide a deterrent and a quicker resolution in
those cases where attorneys lack a meritorious defense. In such cases, respondents
often have nothing to lose regarding expenditure of attorney fees since they either
represeni themselves or their attorney friends or relatives represent them pro bono.
Under the proposed change, attorney fees may be charged for work performed
beginning with the filing of the formal complaint. Finally, the proposed revisions also
expressly exclude a respondent's entitlement or award of attorney fees. Currently, a
respondent is not entitled to costs.
Rule 30(b):
*

No changes.

Rule 30(c): Substantive change; proposed amendment recognizes an exception

(set forth in new subsection (d) below) to the general rule that costs should not be
recoverable in disability cases.
*

Rule 30(d): Substantive change; proposed amendment allows trustees to

collect costs for notification to a respondent's clients. The reason for the change is the
belief that trustees who donate time to attorney disability cases should not be
responsible for costs associated with their volunteer efforts such as charges for postage
or copying.

Rule 31 (Noncompliance with child support order, c h i l d visitation order,
subpoena or order relating to paternity or child s u p p o r t proceeding)
Rule 31(a) and (b): Editing changes: minor revisions are proposed to provide
clarity and consistency.

Rule 32 (Failure to answer charges)
*

Rule 32(a) and (b): Substantive change; Rule 32 is new. These suhn
Actions
provide that a respondent's failure to answer charges constitutes an admissi r
n
of the
allegations, and thai failure to appear before a screening hearing panel, a f w
r
actual
receipt of notice, constitutes an admission of the allegations under consideJra
^io n

or

concession of the motion or recommendations under consideration, i hes* nk

wCha

nges are

based in large part on the corresponding ABA Model Rules for Lawyer Discip|;
Enforcement. The proposed Rule also requires good cause to delay proceed
because of a respondent's failure to appear.

WHEREFORh. the Utah State Bar requests the Court to approve ti> r,
" Ganges to
the Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability as set forth above and reflects •
a
.
«nthe
rediine version of the Rules contained in the addendum.
Dated this 3S

oay of February, 2002,

Katharine A. Fox
General Counsel
rox/PETITlONRLDD
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